CITY LAWSUITS AGAINST THE GUN INDUSTRY:

A Roadmap For Reforming Gun Industry Misconduct

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Published in the
St. Louis University Public Law Review
Symposium Issue On Guns

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I. INTRODUCTION: GUNS HAVE BECOME THE NEXT TOBACCO

On October 30, 1998, New Orleans became the first city in the nation to file suit against the gun industry.\(^1\) Two weeks later, Chicago followed with a second lawsuit.\(^2\) The lawsuits struck an immediate chord with municipal and county officials across the United States, who have been facing widespread gun violence in their communities for years. Within a year of New Orleans’ filing, 28 additional cities and counties have filed suit against gun manufacturers, dealers and trade associations,\(^3\) with additional lawsuits under consideration.\(^4\)


\(^2\) Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., et al., No. 98-CH-015596 (Cook County Circuit Court, Chancery Div.). The complaint is available on the Center’s website, supra note 1.

\(^3\) The 28 additional cities and counties and their dates of filing are: Chicago and Cook County, IL (filed Nov. 12, 1998); Miami-Dade County, FL (Jan. 27, 1999), Bridgeport, CT (Jan. 27, 1999), Atlanta, GA (Feb. 5, 1999), Cleveland, OH (Apr. 8, 1999), Wayne County, MI (Apr. 26, 1999), Detroit, MI (Apr. 26, 1999), Cincinnati, OH (Apr. 28, 1999), St. Louis, MO (Apr. 30, 1999), San Francisco, Alameda County, Berkeley, Sacramento, and San Mateo County, CA (May 25, 1999) (East Palo Alto, and Oakland, CA joined July 16, 1999), Los Angeles, Compton, and West Hollywood, CA (May 25, 1999) (Englewood, CA joined July 16, 1999), Camden County, NJ (June 2, 1999), Boston, MA (June 3, 1999), Newark, NJ (June 9, 1999), Camden, NJ (June 21, 1999), Los Angeles County, CA (Aug. 6, 1999), Gary, IN (Aug. 27, 1999), and Wilmington, DE (Sept. 29, 1999).


The lawsuits focus on three major areas of gun industry misconduct that causes gun violence in communities across America: 1) failing to incorporate feasible safety systems into guns that would prevent widespread firearm misuse by unauthorized users; 2) facilitating illegal gun trafficking by using a porous distribution system; and 3) deceptively advertising and marketing guns in ways that encourage buyers to purchase guns for home security despite overwhelming data indicating this lessens home safety. The lawsuits seek to reform a secretive industry that has too long been able to get away with reckless and irresponsible behavior in the design and marketing of its lethal products.

The city and county gun lawsuits draw inspiration from and build on the lessons learned from the recent public lawsuits against the tobacco industry. For decades, the tobacco industry acknowledged no responsibility for the deaths and debilitating illnesses caused by its products. Likewise, the public tended to see tobacco-related disease as the result of a choice made by the smoker, with little relation to the conduct of the tobacco industry. The wave of state and city lawsuits against the tobacco industry changed all that. Litigation threw the light of day on a secretive industry marketing a lethal product. The public now understands that, for decades, the tobacco industry made conscious choices in the design and marketing of its products – by manipulating nicotine levels, marketing to children, suppressing research findings, and lying about product dangers – that fueled a public health crisis of massive proportions. Litigation also forced the tobacco industry to the bargaining table where it finally acknowledged its responsibility for the harm it had caused and agreed to pay unprecedented damages to state and city governments.

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Through nationwide city and county lawsuits, guns have become the next tobacco. Like the tobacco industry, the gun industry also makes conscious choices that increase the risk of devastating harm to the American people, particularly to children. This article focuses on four of those choices, and the role litigation can play in changing them. First, for years the industry has focused all of its design innovation efforts on making more concealable and/or more powerful guns, while it has blocked installation of feasible, available safety features and devices that would prevent thousands of unintentional shootings and teen suicides, as well as crimes committed with stolen guns. Second, the industry has established a distribution system without controls, and may have consciously targeted criminal markets, thereby making it all too easy for criminals and juveniles to obtain guns from the legal marketplace. Third, the industry has deceptively advertised and marketed guns as increasing the safety of homes, when empirical research has proven that a gun in the home increases the danger to members of the household. Fourth, certain gun makers have marketed high-firepower assault weapons that have no legitimate sporting or self defense use, but are perfectly suited for criminals.

Parallel to the successful lawsuits against the tobacco industry, public entity litigation against the gun industry can thus expose the gun industry’s reckless conduct and help recover at least a portion of the public costs caused by gun violence. Moreover, by forcing the industry to pay damages when its actions cause shootings, the most irresponsible gun industry practices can be changed, thereby helping prevent further gun violence and protecting citizens’ lives. Certainly the public – even a majority of gun owners – believes these reforms should be made.7

This article provides a roadmap for the city and county lawsuits against the gun industry. Section II discusses the costs of gun violence borne by communities. Section III discusses the New Orleans lawsuit model, which alleges that the gun industry’s failure to “personalize” guns by installing feasible, low-cost, locking systems on weapons that too often fall into the hands of youths and other unauthorized users, with tragic results, exposes the industry to liability under basic product liability and negligence law. Section IV explains the Chicago lawsuit model, which charges the industry with recklessly marketing its guns in a manner designed to feed the illegal gun trade, thereby fueling crime in the city and creating a public nuisance. Section V analyzes current legal attacks on two additional areas of gun industry misconduct – deceptive advertising and marketing weapons of mass destruction. Each of the last three sections identifies the

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7 See Susan B. Sorenson, Regulating Firearms as a Consumer Product, 286 SCIENCE 1481 (Nov. 19, 1999) (among Americans polled, 87.9% support making firearms childproof, 72.2% supported personalizing firearms); Stephen P. Teret, et al., Support for New Policies to Regulate Firearms, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 813 (Sept. 1998) (among gun owners polled, 80% favored childproofing, and 59% favored a law requiring personalization); Newsweek Poll: Gun Control, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 16, 1999, online edition (93% favor mandatory waiting period for all handgun buyers, 89% favor mandatory safety locks on new handguns, 74% support registration of all handgun owners, and 68% say military-style assault weapons should be banned).
problems litigation can address, the gun industry’s failure to respond, and the legal theories in support.

II. THE PUBLIC COSTS OF GUN VIOLENCE

Gun violence is a huge problem in America today. In 1997, more than 32,400 people were killed with firearms, making firearms second only to motor vehicles as the most frequent cause of injury death in the United States.\(^8\) Of these, more than 13,500 were homicides and about 17,560 were suicides, with almost 1,000 deaths from unintentional shootings.\(^9\) In addition, more than 64,000 individuals were treated in hospital emergency rooms in 1997 for non-fatal firearm injuries, with more than 13,000 of these victimized by unintentional shootings.\(^10\) Most of these injuries and deaths are caused by handguns.\(^11\)

Of course, firearm injuries and deaths impact the victims of gun violence and their families the hardest. But gun violence also creates significant problems and costs for public entities responsible for protecting public welfare and keeping society safe. Cities, counties, and states have been stuck with a bill for billions of dollars in costs directly resulting from gun violence.\(^12\)


\(^11\) See David Kairys, Legal Claims of Cities Against the Manufacturers of Handguns, 71 Temp. L. Rev. 1, 2 & n.2 (1998) (in 1995, out of 35,957 firearm-related deaths in the United States, an estimated 25,000 were attributable to handguns); ATF—Gun Trace Analysis Reports: The Illegal Youth Firearms Markets in 27 Communities (October 1998) (hereinafter 27 Cities Report) (reporting that approximately 80% of the guns traced to crime are handguns).

\(^12\) Chicago and Wayne County, Michigan alone have estimated public gun violence costs to exceed $850 million every few years. See Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp, et al., supra note 2, amended complaint at 76-77 (itemizing more than $400 million in costs); Wayne County v. Arms Technology, et al., No. 99-912662 NZ, amended complaint at 49 (Wayne County Circuit Court) (estimating public costs at $450 million). See also Melanie Eversley, With Guns, Everyone Pays, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 9, 1999, at 7A (reporting that gun violence costs Detroit taxpayers about $850 million each year); Michael Higgins, Taking Their Best Shot,
These costs include direct injuries to public property, and outlays for medical care, police investigation, emergency rescue services, increased security at schools and public buildings, costs for coroner and funeral services for unknown victims, pensions, disability benefits, higher prison costs, youth intervention programs, and numerous other costs, including lost tax revenues from declining real estate values in neighborhoods beset by gun violence.

Several recent studies have attempted to estimate the total public costs associated with firearm-related injuries. The studies arrive at the same conclusion: the costs are exceptionally high for the tax-paying public. For example, the Los Angeles Times did a report on the public costs


One 1997 study estimated that firearm fatalities each cost $2.8 million. Ted R. Miller & Mark A. Cohen, Costs of Gunshot and Cut/Stab Wounds in the United States, With Some Canadian Comparisons, 29 ACCID. ANAL. & PREV. 329 (1997). This figure included estimates of both direct costs, e.g., medical care, mental health care, emergency transport, police services, and insurance administration costs, and indirect costs, e.g., productivity lost as the result of both physical and psychological injuries, and the costs of pain, suffering, and lost quality of life. The same study estimated the total direct and indirect costs for each nonfatal firearm injury as $249,000 for every hospitalized victim, and $73,000 for each victim who is treated in an emergency room and then released. Total costs in the U.S. approached $126 billion a year. Id.

Several other studies have documented hospitalization costs, and found that a large percentage of gunshot victims are dependent on publicly financed insurance or are uninsured. See, e.g., Mary J. Vasser, et al., Hospitalizations for Firearm-Related Injuries, 275 JAMA 1734 (1996) (study of California hospitalized gunshot victims found that 81% did not have private insurance); Kenneth W. Kizer, et al., Hospitalization Charges, Costs, and Income for Firearm-Related Injuries at a University Trauma Center, 273 JAMA 1768 (1995) (itemizing public bill for 66% of gunshot victims without insurance); Garen J. Wintemute & Mona A. Wright, Initial and Subsequent Hospital Costs of Firearm Injuries, 33 J. TRAUMA 556 (1992) (conducting similar study for earlier period). Of course, hospitalization costs are only a fraction of the total medical costs associated with firearm related injuries. Extensive outpatient services are often needed for the survivors of gunshot wounds, and these services increase the total cost of medical care.
stemming from one teenage victim in South Central, who is now a paraplegic as a result of a gunshot wound.\textsuperscript{14} The costs of the initial response at the crime scene, which included the fire department, paramedics, police officers, and a helicopter were $7,624. The hospital charged $34,794 for the first stage of treatment. The \textit{Times} estimated the cost of additional police investigation and subsequent arrests at $5,999. The teenage paraplegic incurred additional medical charges of $126,603. The public paid $11,627 for the preliminary stages of criminal proceedings and $1,200 for a hospital social worker. The total cost of the trial, incarceration, and appeal was estimated to be $352,649. In addition, the lifetime cost of medical care, disability payments, and special counseling and education classes for the victim was estimated at $490,302, leaving a total public cost of $1,091,768.\textsuperscript{15} More recent reports by the \textit{Washington Post}, \textit{U.S. News \\& World Report}, and others document similar cases with public tabs exceeding one million dollars for a single shooting victim.\textsuperscript{16} With four out of five gunshot victims on public assistance or uninsured,\textsuperscript{17} firearm injuries clearly place an enormous financial burden on the public each year.

Of course, none of the public costs itemized above has been borne by the $2-billion-a-year gun industry,\textsuperscript{18} which is nevertheless responsible for a significant amount of gun violence because of the way it makes and markets its lethal products. The city and county lawsuits are seeking to bring this disparity into balance.

III. THE NEW ORLEANS MODEL -- PROMOTING SAFER GUN DESIGNS

\textsuperscript{14} Bob Sipchen, \textit{Putting a Price Tag on Violence}, L.A. TIMES, June 5, 1994, at A22.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Id.}


\textsuperscript{17} See Gunderson, \textit{supra} note 13, at 483; Headden, \textit{supra} note 16, at 31-34; Vasser, \textit{supra} note 13, at 1736.

\textsuperscript{18} Given that gun companies are nearly all privately held, estimates on the value of the industry vary, with $2 billion per year in the middle of the range. \textit{Compare} Fox Butterfield, \textit{Results in Tobacco Litigation Spur Cities to File Gun Suits}, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1998 (reporting 1997 sales of handguns, rifles, shotguns, and ammunition at $1.4 billion), with Jay Weaver, \textit{supra} note 16, at 1B (estimating $2.5 billion in annual sales).
To understand the basis for the New Orleans lawsuit and the other city and county cases that focus on gun safety, it is helpful to first understand the problem these lawsuits address, and the gun industry’s refusal to do anything to lessen that problem.

A. Unsafe Gun Designs Cause Countless Shootings

Guns, especially handguns, are killing and injuring children and teenagers at an alarming rate. The most recent data indicates that approximately one child is killed, and at least thirteen more are injured, in unintentional shootings each day. The tragic stories fill newspapers across the country, while public health reports recount the deadly toll. Most often these shootings


20 In October 1998, the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence published a report analyzing 137 reports of gun violence culled from newspaper reports and news websites across the country. The incidents resulted in 80 deaths and 84 non-fatal injuries. *A School Year in the U.S.A.*, Center to Prevent Handgun Violence (Oct. 1998). A similar report by the Violence Policy Center used a national clipping service to track unintentional shootings from October 1995 through June 1996, where both the shooter and victim were under 18 years old. Suicides and self-inflicted wounds were excluded. Clippings reporting on 97 shooting deaths and 125 shooting injuries are compiled and explained on a state-by-state basis in their report: *Kids Shooting Kids*, Violence Policy Center (March 1997). *See also Child’s Play: A Study of 266 Unintentional Handgun Shootings of Children*, Center to Prevent Handgun Violence (1988).

are committed by young people who, according to federal law, are prohibited from possessing handguns, but who nevertheless can easily access them.\textsuperscript{22}

The all-too-common scenario is a curious child or teen coming across a loaded gun stored in a home, which they then handle as if it is unloaded, the trigger is pulled, and a playmate or sibling is killed or injured.\textsuperscript{23} A 1991 report by the General Accounting Office ("GAO Report"),

which the victim was under 15); Marilyn Heins, et al., \textit{Gunshot Wounds In Children}, 64 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 326 (1974) (reviewing cases of children admitted to Detroit General Hospital from 1962-1971). Among industrialized nations, the United States is far and away the leader for these types of shootings. \textit{See} Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, \textit{Rates of Homicide, Suicide, and Firearm-Related Death Among Children – 26 Industrialized Countries}, 46 M.M.W.R. 101, 102-03 (1997) (noting that the overall firearm-related death rate for U.S. children 0-14 years old was nearly 12 times higher than among children in the other 25 countries combined).

\textsuperscript{22} A May 1997 study sponsored by the National Institute of Justice showed that 34\% of handgun owners keep their handguns loaded and unlocked. \textit{Guns in America: Results of a Comprehensive National Survey on Firearms Ownership and Use}, Police Foundation (1997). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC") estimate that nearly 1.2 million latchkey children have access to loaded and unlocked firearms. \textit{See} Robert K. Lee, \textit{Latchkey Children and Guns at Home}, 264 JAMA 2210 (1990). A 1998 survey by the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence and Peter D. Hart Research Associates found there was a loaded gun in every 10 households with children. \textit{Parents, Kids & Guns: A Nationwide Survey} (1998). \textit{See also} Mirna M. Farah, et al., \textit{Firearms in the Home: Parental Perceptions}, 104 PEDIATRICS 1059 (Nov. 1999) (in survey of parents with children from 4 to 12 years of age, 52\% of gun owners stored their firearms loaded or unlocked); Yvonne D. Senturia, et al., \textit{Gun Storage Patterns in U.S. Homes With Children}, 150 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 265 (1996) (survey of parents attending pediatric offices found that only 30\% of all households reported that their guns were unloaded and in locked storage).

which surveyed unintentional firearm fatalities in 1988 and 1989, explained the problem. The GAO Report found that 31% of the unintentional firearm deaths studied occurred either because a child six years old or younger was able to fire the weapon (8%), or because the person firing the gun was unaware that the gun was loaded (23%). The GAO Report concluded that all of these shootings could have been prevented by the incorporation of two simple safety devices into firearms – a grip safety and a chamber-loaded indicator.

Teen suicides with firearms – which claimed the life of a child every six to seven hours in 1997 – are another serious problem. From 1970 to 1990, suicide rates among 10- to 19-year-olds nearly doubled. The higher rate has been attributed not to an increase in attempts, but to an increase in the lethality of the means used. By 1991, guns were used in about 65% of male

See Accidental Shootings: Many Deaths and Injuries Caused by Firearms Could Be Prevented, GAO/PEMD-91-9 (March 1991). The report was commissioned by the U.S. Senate. Its purpose was to examine the extent to which certain safety devices, if installed on firearms, could prevent firearm-related deaths. Id. at 15-17. See also A School Year in the U.S.A., supra note 20, at 2 (analyzing shootings that could have been prevented with safer gun designs).

GAO Report at 2-3. The report gave several examples of why a person might believe a gun to be unloaded when in fact it is not. “For example, one might empty a firearm but not notice that a round remains in the chamber, one might typically leave a weapon unloaded and so assume that it is always unloaded, or one might pull the trigger several times without discharge (dry-firing) and so assume the chamber is empty even though it is not.” Id. at 4.

Id. at 2-3. A grip safety can easily be designed to prevent children six years old and younger from firing a handgun, see infra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing “lemon squeezer” safety), and a chamber-loaded indicator is designed to alert users when a gun is loaded. See infra note 50.


See James T. Dixon, On Lemon Squeezers and Locking Devices: Consumer Product Safety and Firearms, A Modest Proposal, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 979, 990 & n.84 (1997) (In the 10-14 year old age group, suicides increased from 0.6 to 1.5 per 100,000 between 1970 and 1990. Among 15-19 year olds, the rate increased from 5.9 per 100,000 in 1970, to 11.1 in 1990.).

See Suicide Among Children, Adolescents, and Young Adults – United States, 1980-1992, 274 JAMA 451 (1995) (noting that the CDC has identified restricting access to methods of suicide as a strategy for reducing suicide among young people); S. Patrick Kachur et al., Suicide in the United States, 1980-1992, CDC (1995) (firearms accounted for 77% of the increase in the age-adjusted suicide rate for the total U.S. population from 1980-1992, and were disproportionately responsible for increases among the young).
teen suicides and 47% of female teen suicides.\textsuperscript{30} Moreover, suicide attempts with firearms are almost always fatal, whereas suicide attempts by other means for the most part rarely are.\textsuperscript{31}

**B. Changing Gun Design Can Save Lives**

One way to dramatically reduce this tragic toll of unintentional shootings and teen suicides is to design handguns in the same way that we design other products – e.g., automobiles – to be inaccessible to youths. We build locking systems into them.\textsuperscript{32} For the last two decades, gun manufacturers have had the ability to design guns to be self-locking, utilizing various types of key or combination devices that prevent the gun from being fired when locked.\textsuperscript{33} Such feasible self-locking devices would “personalize” guns and prevent a whole host of firearm injuries and deaths which now occur when children gain access to guns they do not have the maturity to handle safely. In addition to “personalizing” guns, gun manufacturers can install other simple safeties and warnings to help stop the hundreds of unintentional shootings that occur each year because the person handling the firearm does not realize the gun is loaded.\textsuperscript{34}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{30} National Center for Health Statistics, unpublished data (1991).
  \item \textsuperscript{31} See Murray L. Katcher, \textit{Firearm Injuries Among Children and Adolescents}, 93 \textit{Wisc. Med. J.} 511, 512 (1994) (reporting that when firearm is chosen suicide method, 91% of attempts end in death); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, \textit{Fatal and Nonfatal Suicide Attempts Among Adolescents—Oregon, 1988-1993}, 44 M. M.W.R. 312 (1995) (study of Oregon youths found 78.2% of suicide attempts with firearms were fatal, while only 0.4% of suicide attempts by drug overdose were); Annest, \textit{supra} note 21, at 1751.
  \item \textsuperscript{33} See, e.g., Asra Q. Nomani, \textit{Massacres Spark Interest in Kid-Proof Gun Locks}, \textit{Wall St. J.}, July 16, 1998, at B1. \textit{See also infra} \textsuperscript{§ III(C)} (discussing available safety designs). These internal locking systems should be distinguished from child safety locks, which are simple padlocks that attach to the trigger guard of handguns or other firearms. While child safety locks are certainly valuable, they do not provide the same kind of safety and security that a personalized gun locking system does. \textit{See, e.g., infra} note 52 (noting that Saf-T-Lok system cannot be removed without rendering gun inoperable).
  \item \textsuperscript{34} GAO Report, \textit{supra} note 24, at 24.
\end{itemize}
In 1991, the GAO Report analyzed the number of lives that would have been saved had even simple safeties and load indicators been placed on all firearms. The report concluded that 458 people killed in unintentional shootings -- about one-third of the total -- would have been saved in 1988 alone by incorporating the devices. If the safeties stopped a similar percentage of non-fatal unintentional shootings, another 4,900 to 7,500 unintentional injuries would not have occurred that year.

If “personalized” gun technology were used, obviously a much higher number of shooting deaths and injuries would be prevented. In addition to stopping unintentional shootings by unauthorized users, personalized locking technology could prevent a substantial number of the 1,300 or so teen suicides with firearms that occur every year. Also, if a gun subject to theft has been personalized and locked, it will be useless to thieves who do not have the key or combination. Recent reports indicate that more than 500,000 guns are stolen each year in the United States, and many of these are then used to commit crimes.

Recent highly-publicized school shootings in Jonesboro, Arkansas, Springfield, Oregon, and elsewhere, and the

35 Id. (estimating how many lives would be saved if firearms contained grip safeties and chamber-loaded indicators).

36 Id.

37 Polston & Weil, supra note 32, at 15 & n.27.


41 See, e.g., Guns in American Schools, Center to Prevent Handgun Violence Fact Sheet (Nov. 1999) (listing 73 reported incidents of guns in schools from October 1998 through September 1999); Guns in American Schools, Center to Prevent Handgun Violence Fact Sheet (Oct. 1998) (listing 64 reported incidents of guns in schools from September 1997 through September 1998).
murder of two police officers at the U.S. Capitol, were committed with stolen guns wielded by unauthorized users. Thus, personalized guns can prevent both unintentional and intentional shootings. Indeed, a recent informal study by the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence which looked at both intentional and unintentional shootings found that more than half of them could have been prevented if personalized gun technology were used.

Changing gun design is not the only thing that should or must be done to decrease firearm fatalities and injuries. Also critical is the role of parents in properly securing firearms kept in the home, and the role of training and education. Yet many injury-control experts say that changing the design of a product is generally the most effective way to reduce injury. For example, automobile fatalities have fallen so dramatically over the last twenty-five years not because of changes in driving behavior, but because cars are now designed to be crash-resistant with seat belts, airbags, and other safety improvements, and roadway safety has been improved. Improving product design also applies in more situations, because while training applies only to the individual who has been trained, a safer design can save the life of anyone who comes into contact with the product, whether trained or not.


43 See A School Year in the U.S.A., supra note 20, at 2 (concluding that more than half of 137 incidents of intentional and unintentional shootings would have been prevented had the gun used been personalized).

44 See Polston & Weil, supra note 32, at 16 (explaining the importance of firearm storage in reducing injuries). In addition to advocating safe storage practices, the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence has for years promoted a comprehensive K-12 school-based curriculum called Straight Talk About Risks (STAR) to reduce firearms violence among youths, and fostered various programs with health professionals to help educate the public. The STAR program is far more thorough than the National Rifle Association’s “Eddie Eagle” cartoon show, which has been criticized as doing more to market guns to kids than to promote safety. See Ron Scherer, NRA Gun-Safety Mascot Ruffles Feathers, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 7, 1999, online edition; Joe Camel With Feathers: How the NRA with Gun and Tobacco Industry Dollars Uses its Eddie Eagle Program to Market Guns to Kids, Violence Policy Center (1997).


46 See Bonnie, et al., Reducing the Burden of Injury, supra note 32, at 115-24 (noting that fatalities per 100 million miles has dropped from 4.43 in 1972 to 1.76 in 1996; had 1972 rate applied in 1996, there would have been 110,000 fatalities instead of 43,399. Between 1966 and 1990, 243,000 lives were saved as a result of federal highway, traffic, and motor vehicle safety programs.).
C. “Personalized” Gun Technology Is Available And Feasible, But The Gun Industry Has Refused To Incorporate It Into Gun Designs

Firearm safeties to prevent accidental shootings of children are not new. As early as 1884, Smith & Wesson sold a handgun which utilized a type of grip safety nicknamed a “lemon squeezer,” that could not be fired by children under the age of nine. In 1912, magazine-disconnect safeties were patented to prevent shootings which commonly occur after a person has removed a pistol’s ammunition magazine thinking they have unloaded the gun. A bullet is often left hidden in the chamber, however, with tragic results. This simple device costs less than 50

47 The purpose behind the device was very similar to the purpose behind child-proof caps on bottles holding dangerous substances, from medicine to toxic household chemicals. Smith & Wesson sold 500,000 of the firearms before discontinuing the design in 1940. Certain firearms are still made with grip safeties, but the manufacturers do not describe these as child-resistant. See Krista D. Robinson, et al., Personalized Guns: Reducing Gun Deaths Through Design Changes, JOHNS HOPKINS CENTER FOR GUN POL’Y AND RES. 5 & nn. 43-45 (Sept. 1996). See also Copetas, supra note 23, at 173 & nn. 13-20 (discussing the use of ‘lemon squeezers’ to prevent children from using guns); Dixon, supra note 28, at 993 & nn. 101-13 (listing already existing gun safety devices).

48 See United States Patent Office, Patent #1,024,933 (April 30, 1912) (“A great number of accidents arise from the following cause: The fire arm being loaded, if the magazine is withdrawn, persons little acquainted with the operation of such weapons regard it as unloaded while a cartridge remains in the barrel. Means are known to avoid such accidents by setting the weapon at safety by withdrawal of the magazine.”); U.S. Patent #1,638,068 (Aug. 5, 1926) (“It is well known that the user of an automatic pistol frequently assumes that withdrawal of the magazine necessarily leaves the pistol in inoperative condition and that the trigger may then be safely pulled without danger of discharge . . . one cartridge may remain in the firing chamber”); U.S. Patent #4,031,648 (June 28, 1977) (“It is well known . . . that a live round left in the chamber after the magazine has been removed from its receiver poses a great danger to those who may handle or be exposed to the seemingly unloaded weapon . . . . The newspapers bear repeated and tragic testimony to the seriousness of this deficiency.”). See also Stanton O. Berg, Magazine Safeties: Important Safety Design, AFTE JOURNAL (Oct. 1993) (reviewing magazine safety designs); Hurst v. Glock, infra note 82 (discussing patents and how magazine safety would save lives).

49 See, e.g., Dan Chapman & Kristen Gardner, Teen-Ager Accidentally Shoots 13 Year Old to Death, Police Say, WINSTON-SALEM JOURNAL, Oct. 13, 1989, at 1, 4 (shooter removed ammunition clip from small semi-automatic pistol, thinking it was unloaded when showing it to friend), Maria E. Odum & Robert F. Howe, Fatal Shooting of Fort Belvoir Boy Ruled an Accident, WASH. POST, April 10, 1993, at B1 (13-year-old boy accidentally shot and killed his 10-year-old
cents to install, yet the gun industry puts them only on a few pistols. Various types of chamber-loaded indicators have also been devised over the decades.50

More recently, internal locking systems have been perfected to “personalize” guns. One simple design uses a push-button lock in the handle of the firearm very much like the combination lock on a briefcase.51 The device is secure when locked, but can be unlocked almost instantaneously by the person knowing the combination, even in the dark.52 Several police

brother with a .22 caliber rifle, after loading an ammunition magazine, pulling back the bolt, then removing the magazine, thinking the gun was unloaded).

50 For example, in the early 1900’s, the German Luger pistol had a device that protruded from the top of the pistol when a bullet was in the chamber which said, in German, that the gun was “loaded.” In the 1930’s, several Walther pistols used a pin protruding from the back of pistol to indicate when a bullet was in the chamber. Recently, the Jennings Nine pistol added a chamber load indicator in the form of a red button that sticks out from the top of the pistol.


52 See Bob Lesmeister, Safety In Numbers, AMER. FIREARMS INDUS., Aug. 1996, at 18. This review explained the favorable features of Saf-T-Lok in detail.

Saf-T-Lok is a device that fits onto a revolver or pistol without having to modify the gun or permanently alter it. Once installed, the device allows the gun’s owner to lock it up completely making it impossible to fire. Also, once it is installed, the patented interlock system prevents the lock from being removed without damaging the gun itself. So, if anyone should steal the firearm, it will do them no good because they can’t remove the lock to make it serviceable.

To install the Saf-T-Lok just takes a few minutes. If you can change a set of grips, you can install the Saf-T-Lok. . . . Once on, your customer can set the
departments have been so impressed, they are now incorporating this product into department
handguns, and the State of Maryland is considering requiring this kind of internal lock for all
handguns made or sold in the state by the year 2002. This kind of device can also be designed
to lock itself so that, like airbags in cars, it can save a life even if the owner forgets to engage it. Other personalized guns require the user to wear a special magnetic ring to activate the weapon. Still other designs incorporate key locks or other mechanisms.

lock to any combination he or she prefers. To set the combination all one has to do is ratchet the three buttons in any sequence of preference.

The Saf-T-Lok doesn’t work on batteries so your customers are saving money by not having to buy replacements and there are no keys to worry about, so that if the gun is needed in an emergency situation, it can be unlocked in the fraction of a second. There won’t be any tragedies for the want of a key. The three button system is very easy to operate and you don’t have to see the lock to work it. Anyone can unlock a Saf-T-Lok in total darkness.

Id. at 18, 37. The reviewer also noted that Saf-T-Lok was still working like new after 36,500 test cycles, and is made better than any gun it is designed to fit. Moreover, the designers have yet to come across a handgun that the Saf-T-Lok cannot be adapted to without altering the gun. Id. at 37.

See Joe Matthews, Boston to Require Child-Proof Locks on its Police Department Handguns, BALT. SUN, Dec. 16, 1998 (Boston Police will attach child-proof combination locks to the service weapons of all 2,247 police officers).


See Mike Izumi, Magna-Trigger: The ‘Magic Ring’ Revolver Safety, HANDGUNS, April 1996, at 38 (The Magna-Trigger module is made of aluminum, with strategically placed magnets in the module body. The magnets prevent the trigger from being pulled and hammer from being cocked. A magnetic ring worn by the user cancels the magnetic field, allowing for use.); Robinson, supra note 47, at 6.

See Crila May Hayes, Taurus “Lock” Gun – An Unusual Approach to the Trigger Lock Debate, WOMEN & GUNS, March-April 1998, at 44 (the Taurus locking system is a
In addition to these simple, mechanical designs, other companies have begun using electronic technologies to devise personalized gun designs. One company has incorporated fingerprint recognition technology into handguns as a way of truly linking the firearm to the authorized user.58 In 1996, Colt’s Manufacturing Company unveiled a prototype handgun using radio frequency tags that fire only if the user is wearing a tag emitting a radio frequency matching the one imbedded in the gun.59 This design stemmed from a federal grant awarded to Colt’s to develop a police firearm that could not be fired if it was taken away from the officer by a criminal, since many officers killed in the line of duty are shot with their own guns.60

Based on these advances, Ron Stewart, then CEO and President of Colt’s Manufacturing, called on the industry to create a research and development program to advance personalized gun technology.61 “If we can send a motorized computer to Mars, then certainly we can advance our technology to be more childproof,” he said.62

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59 See Polston & Weil, supra note 32, at 17 (noting that “[t]his technology is both readily available and inexpensive. It is widely used in shoplifting detection systems in department stores, inventory control systems in large businesses, and automated toll booths.”); High Tech Gun Hailed for Safety, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 19, 1996 (.40 Caliber pistol developed by Colt Manufacturing Co., Inc., uses radio frequency technology to block unauthorized use); Melissa Healy, “Smart” Weapon Shoots Holes in Gun Rift Violence, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1998, at A1 (gun can only fire when user is wearing ring containing microchip).


61 Ron Stewart, This Month’s Guest Editorial, AMER. FIREARMS INDUS. (Dec. 1997).

62 Id. See also Henry Goldman, Colt’s Chief Stands Up for Federal Gun Control, Phila. Inquirer, July 13, 1998, online edition (quoting Stewart as saying: “The gun industry is where the automobile industry was in the 1960s – the same clamor for safety regulations. Seat
Unfortunately, Mr. Stewart’s view has not been shared by other industry executives, including his own successor at Colt’s Manufacturing.\textsuperscript{63} Industry spokespeople continue to claim that personalized gun technology is still “years away,” that their current firearm designs are completely safe, and that everyone else is to blame for gun violence.\textsuperscript{64} The only crack in the industry’s stonewalling came in October 1997, when most major handgun manufacturers agreed with President Clinton to begin voluntarily offering child safety locks for sale with new handguns by the end of 1998.\textsuperscript{65} Although this was the first time the industry acknowledged there was something it could do to help save lives, it was motivated not to protect the safety of citizens, but by a desire to stave off more restrictive legislation being considered by Congress and to help the industry in future litigation.\textsuperscript{66} Meanwhile, the industry continues to offer up hundreds of new, more lethal, firearm designs.\textsuperscript{67}

\textbf{See Stewart Resigns as Colt’s Manufacturing President, 7 Firearms Bus. 16, 1 (Sept. 1998) (“[Stewart’s] views of our industry and the issues confronting it differ considerably from those held by most of us.’ ASSC President Georgia Nicols said.”).} Stewart’s successor, Steven Sliwa, has testified against any measure that would mandate personalized guns, while arguing that public funding is needed to research and perfect the technology. \textbf{See Testimony on S113 (proposed New Jersey legislation to require personalized gun technology) at <http://www.colt.com>.}

More recently, Mr. Sliwa stepped down as Colt’s President, announcing plans to open a new company called iColt to develop and market Colt’s new personalized gun. \textbf{See Matt Bai, Under the Gun, Newsweek, Sept. 29, 1999, at 54; Paul M. Barrett, Colt’s Cuts Role Of Handguns In Revamping, Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1999, at A3.} Most recently, Colt’s testified it hoped to have its radio-based personalized gun commercially available in four years. \textbf{See DeLuc, supra note 54, at B1.}

\textbf{See “An Open Letter to Mayor Ganim”, Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc. (Dec. 8, 1998) (seeking to discredit the technology of thumb-print detectors and the use of loaded chamber indicators on .22 caliber pistols, as well as the use of trigger locks on all guns); Ed Schultz (Smith & Wesson CEO), Speak Out: An Open Letter to the Citizens of Boston, Handguns, Nov. 1999, at 15, 17 (claiming that “acceptable” personalized gun technology does not yet exist); Daniel DeLuc, Industry Opposes Glendening ‘Smart Gun’ Plan, Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 1999, at B1 (quoting Beretta executive’s criticisms of personalized gun technology).}


\textbf{See Mike France, Can Gunmakers Disarm Their Attackers? Bus. Week, Nov. 10, 1997, at 94 (quoting Richard Feldman of ASSC as saying that a major reason gun companies}
Any other responsible industry, when faced with overwhelming data of injuries and deaths caused by its products, would not only change product design on items yet to be sold but would recall and retrofit products already in consumers’ hands. Yet for decades gun manufacturers have done little or nothing to make their weapons safer to prevent foreseeable tragedies. Because guns have a unique exemption from federal safety regulations under the Consumer Product Safety Act, there has been no pressure placed on the industry to innovate for safety. Public entity lawsuits have the ability to change that dynamic.

agreed to child safety locks is “because it puts the manufacturers in a better position in front of a jury . . . . We could never take the kind of hit that tobacco could take and survive”); Leslie Wayne, Gun Makers Learn From Tobacco Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1997 (voluntary agreement to sell gun locks was “smart politics in the face of what would have happened. In just a few years, Congress would have required it.”).

There are scores of magazines published by the industry, each of which tout the newest models. See, e.g., SHOOTING TIMES, HANDGUNNING, HANDGUNS, GUN WORLD, GUNS & AMMO, and AMERICAN FIREARMS INDUSTRY. Given the importance to the industry of the market for carrying concealed handguns, much of the recent innovation has been designed to make higher-caliber weapons into smaller and smaller models. See Tom Diaz, Making A Killing: The Business of Guns In America 91-106 (1999) (explaining the industry’s decision to steadily increase the lethality of firearms to tap new markets); Fox Butterfield, To Rejuvenate Gun Sales, Critics Say, Industry Started Making More Powerful Pistols, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1999 (same).


Of course, the fact that the gun industry has universally failed to install personalized gun technology should be no bar to recovery. As the famous case of the T.J. Hooper held:

[I]n most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices . . . . There are precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission.

The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (J. Learned Hand).

The Consumer Product Safety Act (“CPSA”) was passed by Congress in 1972 in response to findings by the National Commission on Product Safety that industry self-regulation was inadequate and consumers were being exposed to too many product dangers. See Dixon,

To address the firearm safety problem, on October 30, 1998, the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence’s Legal Action Project joined with lawyers who had brought ground breaking tobacco litigation to represent the City of New Orleans in filing the first public entity lawsuit in the nation against the gun industry. The lawsuit alleges that children are killed or injured with firearms in New Orleans because of gun manufacturers’ failure to install feasible internal locking devices into their firearms to prevent unauthorized access and misuse. The City is seeking unspecified damages for its costs in responding to this crisis. The City is also hopeful that, in the same way that litigation induced the auto industry to design motor vehicles to be crashworthy, its lawsuit will provide a powerful incentive to the gun industry to redesign firearms in ways that will protect the nation’s youths. Since New Orleans’ suit was launched, about two dozen additional cities and counties have filed suit seeking to force gun manufacturers to make their guns safer. The gun industry is so fearful of facing the merits of these lawsuits, that they have joined with the National Rifle Association in seeking state legislation barring the lawsuits from going forward.

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supra note 28, at 999-1003 (discussing purpose and workings of CPSA). At the time the CPSA was passed, however, firearms were exempted from the Act’s protections, see 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1)(E), due to last-minute lobbying from the National Rifle Association. See Robert J. Spitzer, *The Politics of Gun Control* 104-05, 110 (1995).


72 See *Childproof Handguns: New Jersey Should Create the Market*, THE TIMES (Trenton, N.J.), Jan. 6, 1999, at A18 (drawing analogy between automakers who protested that technology for improved auto safety was not available and would be resisted by buyers because of added costs, and gun makers who make the same complaints today). The Center’s Legal Action Project is also involved in several pending lawsuits brought by individuals to push the industry to change its design practices. See, e.g., Smith v. Bryco Arms (N.M. Court of Appeals) (fourteen-year-old boy would not have been shot by best friend, who was unaware of bullet hidden in chamber, had pistol included magazine-disconnect safety, load indicator, or proper warnings); Mathieu v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. (D. Mass.) (twelve-year-old boy would not have been killed by another twelve-year-old if any of the safeties or warnings discussed above had been incorporated into pistol design).

73 See, e.g., Sharon Walsh, *NRA Moves To Block Gun Suits*, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1999 (reporting on NRA efforts in at least 10 states to block litigation); Roberto Suro, *In Policy Shift, NRA Will Lobby for Gun Makers*, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1999 (discussing NRA teaming with industry to lobby against lawsuits); *Why Stop Cities from Suing?*, USA TODAY, Oct. 21, 1999, at 18A (editorial arguing against blocking city lawsuits). The industry also retaliated against New
The *Morial* case is modeled after another lawsuit – *Dix v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.*\(^ {74}\) -- filed by the Center’s Legal Action Project which has received extensive media attention.\(^ {75}\) The *Dix* case, in which an appeal has been filed,\(^ {76}\) is based on an unintentional shooting scenario that is unfortunately all too common. In May 1994, a fourteen-year-old boy retrieved his father’s 9mm Beretta pistol from the bedroom, placed an empty ammunition magazine in the gun, playfully pointed it at his fifteen-year-old best friend, Kenzo Dix, and pulled the trigger, unaware that a bullet remained hidden in the pistol’s chamber. Kenzo was killed instantly. The Center’s lawsuit alleges that the Beretta pistol was defectively designed because it failed to include an effective chamber-loaded indicator or internal lock that would prevent “unauthorized” users, such as the teenager who shot Kenzo, from firing the weapon. At the time it was made, an internal locking device called “Saf-T-Lok” was available and could have been adapted for the Beretta. Other locking designs were also feasible.\(^ {77}\) Beretta, however, considered no alternative designs, instead routing all product safety ideas sent to the company through its in-house lawyer, who promptly rejected each one. Beretta also turned a blind eye to reports of unintentional shootings, and took no steps to determine how serious a problem its guns presented to families with children.

**E. Legal Issues**


\(^ {74}\) No. 750681-9 (Alameda County Cal. Super. Ct.).


\(^ {76}\) At a trial held in October-November 1998, the jury ruled 9-3 for Beretta on the gun safety count. *See* Henry K. Lee, *Gunmaker Not to Blame for Berkeley Boy’s Slaying, Jury Decides*, S.F. CHRONICLE, Nov. 17, 1998, online edition (the jury found 7-5 against Beretta on a failure to warn claim, but this was short of the 9 votes needed for a verdict). The Center has appealed on grounds of jury misconduct and other issues. *See* Dix v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. A086018 (Cal. Ct. App.).

\(^ {77}\) *See supra* notes 51-60 and accompanying text (discussing available safety designs).
The *Morial* claims against the gun manufacturers are brought under Louisiana’s product liability statute, while the claims against three industry trade associations and six local firearms distributors are brought in negligence.\(^78\) The primary legal theory in *Morial* is based on the provable fact that the industry markets defective products which unnecessarily cause injuries to New Orleans citizens and the City, which must respond to the crisis.\(^79\) A federal judge recently held that the City stated a cause of action against defendants on these grounds.\(^80\) Moreover, this theory is viable in nearly every state.

[Virtually every jurisdiction recognizes that a product may be defective if its design presents an inherent risk of serious injury and existing technology can be used to produce a safer design without undue costs or interference in the

\(^78\) See Louisiana Products Liability Act, La. Rev. Stat. § 2800.51-.56, the “Louisiana Products Liability Act.” Under the statute, which establishes the exclusive theory of liability for manufacturers for damage caused by defective products, *id.* § 2800.52, negligence could not be alleged against the manufacturers, nor could local sellers be charged under products liability. *See id.* § 2800.53-.56. In other jurisdictions, cities have pled the gun safety issue under additional causes of action, including public nuisance, civil conspiracy, violation of consumer protection standards, and unjust enrichment. *See, e.g.*, Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., et al., No. 99-2590 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dep’t of Trial Court, Suffolk) (public nuisance and unjust enrichment); Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., et al., No. CV-99-0361279S (Conn. Super. Ct., Waterbury) (civil conspiracy and consumer protection statute). *See also* CPHV website, *supra* note 1 (index with additional city complaints).

\(^79\) Under Louisiana’s statute, a product manufacturer is liable to a claimant for damage proximately caused by a characteristic of the product that renders the product unreasonably dangerous when such damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use. *La. Rev. Stat.* § 2800.54(A). A product is “unreasonably dangerous” in design if, at the time the product was made, (1) there existed an alternative design that was capable of preventing the claimant’s damage and (2) the likelihood that the product’s design would cause the damage and the gravity of the damage outweighed the burden on the manufacturer of adopting an alternative design, and the adverse effect, if any, of the alternative design on the utility of the product. *Id.* § 2800.56.

The City has recently amended its complaint to add causes of action seeking recovery for damages related to the gun industry’s negligent distribution practices, as Chicago and other cities have pled in their complaints. *See infra* section IV.

performance of the product. In many jurisdictions, it is irrelevant whether the safer alternative design has been incorporated into a product currently on the market. Manufacturers have a responsibility to pursue available technology to make their products safer or face liability.\footnote{Polston & Weil, supra note 32, at 19 & nn. 62-64 (reviewing state products liability laws). See also Copetas, supra note 23, at 177-84 & nn. 53-54 (discussing risk-utility test and applying it to handgun design); Dixon, supra note 28 at 996-99 (analyzing liability for gun manufacturers for design defects).}

In the Dix case, this theory was tested on Beretta’s motion for summary judgment, and both the trial court and California Court of Appeal permitted plaintiffs to go to trial.\footnote{In Dix, after the trial court rejected Beretta’s motion for summary judgment, Beretta sought a writ of mandate to the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed the trial court’s decision. See Polston & Weil, supra note 32, at 19-20 (discussing favorable features of California law).} A New Jersey appellate court also recently held that a gun could be defective because it failed to utilize a feasible safety that would have prevented a child from unintentionally shooting her friend.\footnote{Hurst v. Glock, 684 A.2d 970 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. 1996). In Hurst, a fifteen-year-old boy found his mother’s boyfriend’s police service pistol in its unsecured holster after the officer had gone out. His fourteen-year-old girl friend then arrived, but before they went to school, they went into the kitchen where the boy removed the magazine and the bullets therein. The girl picked up the gun, believing it to be unloaded, pointed it at the boy, and pulled the trigger. The bullet hidden in the chamber fired and hit the boy in the head, causing catastrophic injuries. Noting that magazine-disconnect safeties have been “state of the art” since 1910, that these types of unintentional shootings are common, and that the gun would not have fired had it been equipped with that safety, the court held that a jury could find the officer’s Glock pistol defective. Id. at 974. See also Lemaster v. Glock, 610 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that lack of external safety in firearm could render it defective).} A 1998 decision by the Supreme Court of Ohio\footnote{Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc., 700 N.E.2d 1247 (Ohio 1998).} explains why an industry’s failure to child-proof products likely to be misused by children exposes it to liability. Applying Ohio’s risk-benefit analysis to a “properly functioning” disposable lighter, the court held that the jury could find a
lighter not equipped to prevent activation by children posed an excessive preventable danger and could therefore be defective. 85

This is not to say that all jurisdictions fully embrace the legal theories underpinning *Morial*. For example, some jurisdictions may deny recovery if the product is misused by unintended users. 86 Other jurisdictions restrict products liability to situations where the product fails to meet the expectations of the ordinary consumer, 87 which may be more difficult to prove in this instance because the public does not yet widely expect guns to be self-locking to prevent unauthorized access and misuse. Still other jurisdictions hold that because firearms pose open and obvious dangers, recovery is barred. 88

The decisions restricting recovery, however, are not soundly reasoned. Product misuse in gun defect cases is most often committed by juveniles who cannot appreciate the dangers posed by firearms. Moreover, such misuse is both completely foreseeable, as it happens thousands of times each year, and is entirely preventable by the incorporation of feasible alternative designs. 89

85 *Id.* at 1249-52. In holding that it is reasonably foreseeable that children would access disposable lighters and play with them, the court noted statistics showing they have been linked to 170 deaths and 1,190 injuries per year. *Id.* at 1252. These numbers are horrific, but are much smaller than the numbers of children killed and injured by firearms each year. *See supra* notes 19-21 and accompanying text.

The case also holds that the risk-benefit test applies to properly functioning handguns that could be made safer. Perkins, 700 N.E.2d at 1249-50. In that sense, it distinguishes a series of cases brought in the 1980s which argued that handguns were defective *per se* because their risk of misuse in crime outweighed their social benefits. All but one of these latter cases failed. *See*, e.g., King v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 451 N.W.2d 874 (Mich. App. 1990); Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758 (D.C. 1989); Caveny v. Raven Arms Co., 665 F. Supp. 530 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff’d 849 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1988); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771 (D.N.M. 1987), aff’d 843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1988). The one that succeeded -- Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985) -- was later negated by the Maryland legislature.

86 *See* Griffs v. BIC Corp., 981 F.2d 1429, 1433 (3d Cir. 1992).

87 *See* Polston & Weil, *supra* note 32, at n.72.

88 *See* Copetas, *supra* note 23, at 184-85 (discussing cases).

89 *See* Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc., 700 N.E.2d 1247, 1252 (Ohio 1998) (strict liability “contemplates that a manufacturer may be liable for failing to use a foreseeable alternative design that would have prevented harm caused by an unintended but reasonably foreseeable use of its product”); Hernandez v. Tokai Corp., 1999 Tex. Lexis 100, *11* (Tex. 1999) (“the fact that the foreseeable risk of harm is due to a misuse of the product, rather than an intended use, is not an absolute bar to liability for that portion of an injury caused by a product’s
Application of the consumer expectations test does not account for the fact that the people injured by firearms are usually not the purchasers, and will not be protected unless the risk to them is considered. Finally, the risks posed by unsafe firearms are not really “open and obvious” – since a bullet in the firearm chamber cannot be seen and, even if they were, that should not shield a manufacturer that can prevent the danger by incorporating a feasible safety device.

IV. THE CHICAGO MODEL -- ATTACKING GUN TRAFFICKING AND INDUSTRY MARKETING PRACTICES

The Chicago lawsuit, and the numerous city and county suits like it, attacks a very different problem caused by the gun industry – loose marketing practices that move firearms from the legal marketplace into criminals’ and juveniles’ hands. To understand the problems with that marketing system, some background is required.

A. Negligent Firearms Marketing Fuels Crime

The legal firearms market is made up of two levels: the primary market, which comprises all transactions involving the licensed gun industry; and the secondary market, where unlicensed defective design”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2, cmt. p (1998) (liability may attach if risks of harm related to foreseeable misuse could have been reduced by reasonable alternative design); Polston & Weil, supra note 32, at 20 (criticizing misuse doctrine); Copetas, supra note 21, at 185-86 (same).

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF Torts § 2, cmt. g (1998) (rejecting notion that conformance with consumer expectations can block recovery where safer design available); Perkins, 700 N.E.2d at 1249 (holding product manufacturer can be liable under risk-benefit test even if not liable under consumer expectations test); Copetas, supra note 23, at 176 (criticizing consumer expectations test as failing to provide incentive to make safer products).

See GAO Report, supra note 25, at 3 (noting that 23% of unintentional shootings could be prevented if person realized the firearm was loaded).

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF Torts § 2, cmt. d (1998) (obviousness of design-related risk does not preclude finding of defect, if plaintiff can establish that reasonable alternative design would have reduced or prevented injury to plaintiff); Perkins, 700 N.E.2d at 1251 & n.3 (obviousness of risk for disposable lighters may be outweighed by other risk-benefit factors where childproof design available); Hernandez, 1999 Tex. Lexis 100, *13 (obviousness of danger is not an absolute bar to liability for a defective design); Polston & Weil, supra note 32, at 20 (criticizing open and obvious doctrine); Copetas, supra note 23, at 184-85 (same).
persons act as both buyer and seller.\textsuperscript{93} In the primary market, gun manufacturers sell their guns mainly to wholesale distributors, who in turn resell the firearms to storefront dealerships, who then sell the guns to the public.\textsuperscript{94} The three layers of sellers -- manufacturers, distributors, and dealers -- are all federally licensed, and must comply with certain limited federal paperwork requirements in making gun sales.\textsuperscript{95} Manufacturers and distributors must keep acquisition and disposition records to show how and when they acquired and sold all guns.\textsuperscript{96} Dealerships must ask public buyers to fill out a form and show identification, then wait until an instant background check is completed before selling the gun.\textsuperscript{97} Once members of the public receive firearms, however, there is little or no federal regulation placed on resale of the weapons in the secondary market. Moreover, the system can be readily subverted by firearms dealers willing to look the other way when “straw purchasers” with clean criminal records buy guns on behalf of disqualified persons.


\textsuperscript{94} Guns that are imported go through a similar distribution system. See 18 U.S.C. § 923; 27 C.F.R. §§ 47, 178-79. Many foreign manufacturers, such as Beretta and Glock, have domestic distribution companies that bear the manufacturer’s name.


\textsuperscript{96} See 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(A).

\textsuperscript{97} See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s). The background check is designed to weed out convicted felons, people who have been committed to a mental institution, and other disqualified purchasers. See \textit{id.} §§ 922(d), (g) (listing 9 categories of persons disqualified under federal law from being sold or owning firearms). From November 1993 through November 1998, only handgun purchasers were required to submit to the background check under a system that allowed law enforcement up to five days to complete a check of records. By November 1998, all firearm purchasers were required to submit to checks, but the system was also required to be computerized for instant checking, so that purchasers could leave the store with their gun. Although the instant-check system has problems because many records are still not computerized, background checks have been overwhelmingly successful in stopping direct sales to criminals. See, e.g., Donald A. Manson, \textit{Presale Handgun Checks, the Brady Interim Period, 1994-98}, Bureau of Just. Stat. Bull. (June 1999) (noting that approximately 312,000 felons and other disqualified buyers have been turned away because of the background check from March 1, 1994 through December 1998).
According to the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (“ATF”), “[v]irtually all new firearms used in crime first pass through this legitimate distribution system of federally licensed firearms dealers.”

The volume of guns sold in the primary market is enormous, ranging from 2.5 to 3.9 million handguns, and another 2.7 million long guns, a year. Data developed for a lawsuit against the gun industry indicates that a substantial proportion of handguns sold through this legal marketplace end up being used in crime. Moreover, 43% of the handguns recovered nationwide between August 1, 1997 and July 31, 1998 that were traced as part of a

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98 U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, A Progress Report: Gun Dealer Licensing & Illegal Gun Trafficking 1 (Jan. 1997) [hereinafter A Progress Report] (statement of Raymond W. Kelly, Under Secretary (Enforcement)). See also Polston, supra note 93, at 828 & n.36 (“‘Smith & Wesson has never shipped a shipment from their factory marked, ‘Shipped for use by felons . . . .’ At some stage in the process, those firearms are diverted into the hands of felons. And it is, in almost every case, by a federal licensee.’”) (quoting Bill Bridgewater, Executive Director, National Alliance of Stocking Gun Dealers).


100 See Allen & Portes, supra note 99, at 5-6, Ex. 1 (concluding that more than 600,000 handguns sold in the U.S. in 1989, or nearly 24% of that year’s total, were used in crime before the end of 1997, while more than 760,000 handguns sold in 1993 (19.7%) were used in crime before the end of 1997). Since the lawsuit in which Ms. Allen and Mr. Portes were retained -- Hamilton v. Accu-Tek -- involved shootings with handguns only, they did not similarly analyze the diversion of long guns into crime. However, independent data shows in the vast majority of crimes where firearms are used, handguns are the weapon of choice. See Polston, supra note 83, at 821 & n.4 (noting that 13,495 murders were committed in 1992 with handguns, or 87% of the total number of firearm murders). See also ATF - The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative - The Illegal Youth Firearms Markets in 17 Communities 7, Dep’t of Treasury (July 1997) [hereinafter 17 Cities Report] (“Eight out of ten crime guns traced are handguns. . . . In all sites, handguns are the largest category of firearms recovered by enforcement agencies.”).
criminal investigation were sold in the primary market within the previous three years,\textsuperscript{101} which ATF considers a strong indicator that the guns were trafficked for illegal use.\textsuperscript{102}

There are a number of reasons why firearms sold legally end up being diverted easily to crime. First, there is no federal limit on the number of guns that can be bought in a single sale. Multiple sales must be recorded by the dealer, and the forms forwarded to ATF and local law enforcement, but these reporting requirements do not preclude the sale.\textsuperscript{103} Second, there is no federal regulation of secondary sales, including no paperwork or background check requirements. Thus, once “straw purchasers”\textsuperscript{104} leave the gun store, they can resell firearms without creating a paper trail. Finally, law enforcement’s ability to curb illegal gun trafficking is constrained by limits on the number of ATF investigators, congressional restrictions on computerizing records, and broad legal loopholes that make trafficking convictions difficult to secure.\textsuperscript{105} These

\textsuperscript{101} See 27 Cities Report, supra note 11, at 9; U.S. Dep’ts of Treasury and Justice, 
\textit{Gun Crimes in the Age Group 18-20} 4 (June 1999). See also Allen & Portes, supra note 99, at 6, Ex. 2 (finding based on earlier data that 39% of handguns traced to crime had been sold commercially within previous three years); Wachtel, supra note 93, at 229 (noting that “[p]istols seemed especially prone to quick turn-around: a third were seized within one year and more than half within two years.”).

\textsuperscript{102} 27 Cities Report, supra note 11, at 8; Wachtel, supra note 93, at 229. ATF “estimates that newer crime guns comprise 25-36% of the guns recovered from juveniles, 32-49% of the guns recovered from youths aged 18-24, and 27-40% of the guns recovered from adults.” 27 Cities Report, supra note 11, at A2.

\textsuperscript{103} ATF defines a multiple sale as the sale by a licensed gun dealer of two or more handguns to an unlicensed person within a five day period. 27 C.F.R. § 178.126a. When making such sales, dealers are required to fill out and forward to ATF a Form 3310.4 which lists the guns sold.

\textsuperscript{104} “Straw purchasers” are persons with clean records who purchase guns for others – usually criminals, juveniles, or other dangerous buyers. See Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, Federal Firearms Regulations Reference Guide 97 (Oct. 1995).

\textsuperscript{105} See Fox Butterfield, \textit{Limits on Power and Zeal Hamper Firearms Agency}, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1999, at A1 (discussing constraints on ATF, including fact that agency has only 9 more agents than the 1,622 it had in 1973, while the Drug Enforcement Administration is up to 4,261 agents from 1,370 in 1973); Andrew Conte, ‘Bad Apple’ Gun Dealers Hard to Stop, CINCINNATI POST, Sept. 20, 1999, online edition (current federal law makes it extremely difficult for the ATF to crack down on bad dealers); David Montgomery, Weapon Study Details Arming of D.C. Youth, WASH. POST, July 20, 1997, at B1 (noting inability of ATF to trace more than 37% of 37,589 firearms recovered at crime scenes); Tom Jackman, Gun Dealer’s Legacy: Pain, K.C. STAR, Oct. 5, 1996, at A1 (explaining the difficulty authorities have tracking and getting convictions for illegal gun sales); Tori Marlan, Dealing Death, CHICAGO READER, June 6, 1997, at
constraints are no accident. They are due to heavy lobbying by the gun industry and the National Rifle Association.\(^{106}\)

Certain states have attempted to tighten control on these markets to prevent guns from being diverted to crime. For example, as will be discussed below, Virginia passed a law limiting sales to one handgun per month per buyer, while other states have imposed limited controls on secondary sales.\(^{107}\)

Unfortunately, these laws are not uniform and so can be circumvented by traffickers making purchases in states with weak gun laws and then transporting the guns to states with stronger laws.\(^{108}\) Naturally, criminals take advantage of these holes in the system to obtain a ready supply of firearms for illicit purposes.\(^{109}\) A number of methods are employed.

\(^{106}\) See Butterfield, \textit{ supra } note 105, at A1 (describing ATF difficulties in pursuing firearm trafficking violations because of legal loopholes pressed for and won by gun lobby); David B. Ottaway, \textit{ System Shot Full of Holes }, \textit{ WASH. POST } July 11, 1999, at A1 (due to lobbying by groups like the NRA, an estimated 40\% of the nation’s gun market is largely unregulated); Matt Bai, \textit{ Clouds Over Gun Valley }, \textit{ Newsweek }, Aug. 23, 1999, at 34 (describing how the NRA, who once referred to the ATF agents as “jackbooted thugs,” is frequently at odds with the government agency); \textit{ Gun Shows In America: Tupperware Party for Criminals }, Violence Pol’y Center 9-13 (1996) (discussing how 1986 McClure/Volkmer bill backed by NRA made changes in federal law that increased the number of gun shows and allowed illegal sales to flourish).

\(^{107}\) See \textit{ VA. CODE ANN. } § 18.2-308.2:2(Q) (Michie 1993) (one-gun-a-month law); Cal. Penal Code § 12072(d) (requiring every gun transfer to go through a federal firearms licensee or law enforcement agency, with the same background check, waiting period, and paperwork required for new sales).

\(^{108}\) Under federal law, persons without federal firearms licenses can only purchase handguns in their state of residence. 18 U.S.C. § 922(b). This limitation is intended, in part, to give effect to state laws that regulate firearms transactions more strictly than federal law. It is often circumvented, however, by interstate trafficking of firearms from states with weak gun laws to states with strong gun laws. See Allen & Portes, \textit{ supra } note 99, at 7-11 (analyzing how handguns are smuggled from weak law states to strong law states); Fox Butterfield, \textit{ Report Links }
A leading source of firearm diversion is sales to “straw purchasers.” As the Chief of ATF’s Crime Gun Analysis Bureau has said, based on data from tracing projects in 27 cities nationwide,

the [most important] single source of firearms is still illegal traffickers who are acquiring firearms from retail outlets. It still appears that acquisition of firearms by false declarations and straw purchasers are still the method preferred by traffickers, both small and large.110

Indeed, in one major federal study of gun trafficking, straw purchasing accounted for almost 50% of the firearms trafficked into crime.111

Although straw sales are often made one gun at a time,112 the impact is obviously much

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109 See Wachtel, supra note 93, at 221-22, Table I (reviewing studies showing how criminals obtain guns).


111 Performance Report, supra note 110, at 12 (47.8% of ATF illegal firearm trafficking investigations involved straw purchases).

112 See, e.g., Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., supra note 2, amended complaint at 16-20 (identifying instances where gang members supplied Chicago street gangs with dozens of
more severe if large quantities of guns are bought and resold. Numerous reports have documented multiple sale schemes involving hundreds, or even thousands of guns, where the guns purchased end up being traced to crime.\footnote{113} Moreover, evidence indicates that multiple sale guns may be twice as likely as other guns to be picked up in crime in a state other than where they were bought, indicating their important role in interstate trafficking.\footnote{114} All evidence suggests that the volume of multiple sales transactions is quite high.\footnote{115}

\footnote{113} See Polston, supra note 93, at 821, 831-34 (reporting on cases); Wachtel, supra note 93, at 230-33 (same); A Progress Report, supra note 98, at 13 (same); Federal Firearms Licensing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., 8-10 (June 17, 1993) [hereinafter House Hearing] (same). See also Jeffrey Taylor, Mr. Sizer’s Sideline: How a Gun Supplier Goes About Business, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 1999, at A1 (explaining how owner of Christian bookstore trafficked more than 90 guns straw purchased at Philadelphia gun stores); Vanessa O’Connell, Legally Sold Gun Ended Up In Killer’s Hand, WALL ST. J., July 13, 1999, at B1 (describing how gun used in deadly shooting spree was obtained through person who bought 65 guns in two years from Illinois dealer); Clea Benson, Metro Section, PHILA. INQUIRER, March 17, 1998 (telling story of couple who resold 55 AK-47 assault rifles bought at local gun stores); Conviction on Gun Charges, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 1997 (man convicted of selling 300 weapons in D.C. he bought from dealers and gun shows); Clifford Krauss, Guns Found At Crime Scene Yield Trove of Clues On Traffickers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1997, at B1 (tracking four handguns found at shooting of New York police officer to ring of traffickers); Michael James, How Maryland Outlaws Get Around Gun Laws, BALT. SUN TIMES, March 26, 1995, at 1A (recounting case of Baltimore woman who bought $6000 worth of guns for drug dealer in one trip.); Bruce Frankel, New York Shooting Investigation Zeroes In On Gun, U.S.A. TODAY, March 9, 1994, at 10A (reporting on New Yorkers with Florida identification who bought 132 handguns in Florida, half of which were intercepted on I-95 on their way to the northeast); Michael Isakoff, Gun Pipeline: From Ohio to Streets of Philadelphia, WASH. POST, March 12, 1991, at A1 (reporting on trafficker who traveled to Ohio to buy 135 handguns, then resold them on streets of Philadelphia for profit of $200-300 per gun); U.S. v. Bryan, 1997 U.S. App. Lexis 2340 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining methods of convicted trafficker).

\footnote{114} See Testimony of Sarah Brady, Chair, Handgun Control, Inc. before Senate Judiciary Committee (Sept. 2, 1998) (explaining Center to Prevent Handgun Violence study of 1173 multiple sales guns traced to crime).

\footnote{115} In 1991 and 1992, before Virginia enacted its one-gun-a-month law, there were 6,835 cases in which one person bought two or more handguns from the same Virginia dealer in less than a week. See Pierre Thomas, Wilder Bill Would Disrupt Thousands of Gun Sales, WASH.
Corrupt firearms dealers have posed another problem. Until recently, in addition to storefront firearms dealers, there were also thousands of persons, known as “kitchen-table dealers,” who obtained federal firearms licenses and sold guns out of their homes. At one point, there were more firearms dealers in America -- over 280,000 -- than gas stations. Needless to say, the large number of dealers posed extraordinary law enforcement problems and were the source of thousands of guns entering the illegal market. Passage of the Brady Law in 1993 reduced the number of dealers by raising the fee for federal firearms licensees from $10/year to $200 for a three-year license, and requiring applicants to certify that they would comply with state and local licensing and zoning requirements. The result has been a drop of well over 50% in the number of federal firearms licensees (“FFLs”), and a steady decrease in the number of

Post, Jan. 19, 1993, at A1. In another report, the ATF field division in Southern California documented over 5,700 instances of multiple sales involving 13,181 handguns. Almost 18% of these multiple sales involved individual purchases of three or more guns. Bureau of ATF, Sources of Crime Guns in Southern California 21 (1995). More recent data from Philadelphia indicates that in 1996 and part of 1997, purchasers of more than one handgun accounted for almost half of the total number of handguns sold in that city, buyers of three or more handguns made up 30% of total sales, and buyers of five or more handguns -- only 3% of the buyers -- bought 17% of the weapons, for an average of 8.8 guns each. See Kairys, supra note 11, at 8 & n.22. In 1998, as many as 22% of the handguns sold in California were part of multiple sales.

People of the State of California v. Arcadia Machine & Tool, No. BC 210894, amended complaint at 21 (Los Angeles Super. Ct.).


117 See Polston, supra note 93, at 826-27, 835-39 (discussing problems with kitchen-table dealers); Wachtel, supra note 93, at 222, 230-34 (reviewing 28 gun diversion cases in Los Angeles area between 1992 and 1995 involving 19,145 guns; corrupt dealers bought 13,128 of these guns from wholesale distributors, or about 68%); Burt Hubbard, I Dealer Sold 36 Guns Used in ’98 Crimes, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 9, 1999, online edition (one Colorado gun dealer was the source of 36 guns traced to crimes in 1998; four dealers were the source of ten or more crime guns); Bob Port, Sometimes the Dealer Is a Criminal, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 28, 1993, at 7 (detailing stories of convicted felons who have been allowed to retain and/or renew their federal licenses); Pierre Thomas, Hit-or-Miss Control of Firearm Sales, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 1992, at A1 (reporting that a dozen Detroit dealers have been charged with supplying 2,000 guns to criminals in the city); House Hearing, supra note 113, at 64 (statements of Sen. Simon) (“At least 600 federally licensed dealers have been arrested on criminal charges in the last five years.”).

118 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 923(a), (d); A Progress Report, supra note 98, at 2-3 (explaining changes).
kitchen-table dealers. Nevertheless, corruption remains a significant problem, even among storefront dealers. Undercover sting operations in Chicago, Wayne County, Michigan, and Gary, Indiana have proved that firearms dealers are loathe to turn away paying customers, even if they openly admit to being felons or juveniles. And some dealers have pumped literally thousands of guns into the illegal market. Thefts from firearms dealers is another source of crime guns.

119 See A Progress Report, supra note 98, at 2-10.

120 See, e.g., Wachtel, supra note 93, at 234 (concluding that “[d]ealer corruption emerged as a surprisingly significant source of supply” in study of the sources of crime guns); infra note 121, and accompanying text (discussing undercover investigation of Chicago-area, Wayne County, Michigan, and Northern Indiana storefront dealers who were eager to sell guns to straw buyers).

121 See Chicago v. Beretta, supra note 2, amended complaint at 22-54 (discussing results of sting); McNamara v. Arms Technology, supra note 12, amended complaint at 25-34 (same); King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 45DO2-9908-CT-0355, complaint at 15-20 (Lake County Superior Court) (same). See also Parmer v. Carter’s Country, No. 97-48432, July 14, 1998 deposition of Dana King (Harris Co. Texas District Ct.) (explaining how supervisors admonished gun store clerk who turned away buyers with criminal records, advising him to ask felons whether person with clean record could purchase gun for them).

122 See House Hearing, supra note 113, at 3-4 (statements of Rep. Schumer) (detailing stories of “Dirty Dozen” of corrupt FFLs who trafficked more than 12,000 guns); Senator Charles Schumer, A Few Bad Apples: Small Number of Gun Dealers the Source of Thousands of Crime Guns (June 1999) (identifying 1% of dealers who collectively sold nearly half of all guns traced to crime between 1996 and 1998); Glenn L. Pierce, et al., The Identification of Patterns in Firearm Trafficking: Implications for Focused Enforcement Strategies ii (ATF 1995) (a small number of FFLs participating in illegal firearms trafficking are capable of causing exponential damage by supplying firearms directly or indirectly to the criminal element); Laura Parker, ‘It Was Easy:’ Confessions of a Gun Trafficker, U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 28, 1999, at 1A (person able to traffic more than 1,000 handguns in eight months using forged federal firearms license); Jackman, supra note 105, at A1 (a local gun dealer illegally sold 1300 guns over a 3 year period); J.R. Moehringer, Man Charged With Providing Guns to Gangs, LA TIMES, Apr. 15, 1995, at B1 (California man had close to 1700 crime guns traced to him); see also supra note 117 (identifying additional corrupt dealers).

123 See Wachtel, supra note 93, at 232 (noting that thefts from commercial outlets accounted for 11% of guns diverted to crime in Southern California study); Valerie Park, Stolen Firearms, CGAB Shots 1, 3-4 (Oct. 1998) (discussing stolen firearms data received by ATF).
Gun shows -- which occur in at least 100 cities nationwide every weekend -- also permit widespread illegal trafficking in firearms because most gun show sales are unregulated. Unlicensed sellers are not required in most states to fill out any paperwork on the sale, or wait for a background check to be completed. The proliferation of these temporary gun supermarkets also overtaxes law enforcement, which has limited resources to police these sales. With the Brady background check turning away more than 300,000 disqualified gun buyers from gun stores in just a few years, many of these purchasers have no doubt turned to gun shows to obtain guns for use in crime.


125 See Gun Shows in America, supra note 124, at 20 (quoting ATF agent Ed Gleba: “There are just too many gun shows and not enough agents”); House Hearing, supra note 113, at 30 (remarks of ATF Director Higgins that, with thousands of gun shows, ATF covers only a minute percent because of lack of manpower); Erik Larson, Private Gun Sales Go Unregulated At Shows and at Flea Markets, WALL ST. J., July 12, 1994, at A1 (discussing lack of oversight); David Olinger, Gun Shows: Open Season for Lawless Shopping, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 28, 1993, at 1A (outlining enforcement problems and resultant illegal sales).

126 See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Implementation of Brady Law 5 (Sept. 1999) (estimating that 312,000 prohibited persons were prevented from purchasing firearms during interim Brady law, and tens of thousands more under permanent Brady law); Manson, supra note 97, at 1 (giving full data on Brady rejections).

127 See Gun Shows, supra note 124, at 6-9 (noting that in 314 firearms trafficking investigations involving gun shows, felons buying or selling firearms were involved in more than 46% of the cases); Polston, supra note 93, at 837-39 (explaining problem); House Hearing, supra note 113, at 8-14 (testimony of convicted felon Edward Daily regarding how easy it was to purchase multiple guns at gun shows in Virginia for resale in New York City); Philip J. Cook, et al., Regulating Gun Markets, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59, 89 (1995) (discussing “gun show cowboys” who travel from state-to-state selling semi-automatic handguns); Melvin Claxton & William Gaines, Killer Covered Tracks at Gun Shows, CHICAGO TRIB., Dec. 30, 1997 (reporting case of serial killer who bought and sold murder weapons at gun shows). Numerous licensed dealers who have sold at gun shows have been arrested for selling guns without having a proper background check performed. See, e.g., United States v. Calloway, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 25553 (6th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (dealer sold weapon to convicted felon); Ciznewski v. Department of Treasury, 773 F. Supp. 148, 151 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (dealer sold guns in violation of Wisconsin 48-hour waiting period); Mayhew v. Virginia, 458 S.E.2d 305, 310 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding conviction of dealer); Guns Shows in America, supra note 125, at 18 (reporting arrest of fifty individuals in 1994 at Pennsylvania gun shows).
The gun industry takes advantage of these weaknesses in the law to market more of their guns to criminals and juveniles. For example, evidence presented in the Hamilton v. Accu-Tek\textsuperscript{128} case in New York suggests that the industry deliberately targets areas with lax gun control laws for higher gun sales than can be supported by the legal marketplace, knowing that guns purchased there will be trafficked into states and cities with tougher gun laws.\textsuperscript{129} In another case, an analysis of the sales practices of Lorcin Engineering, which made cheap “Saturday Night Special” handguns, concluded that the company’s marketing strategy emphasized “saturation sales in certain high-crime metropolitan areas.”\textsuperscript{130}

B. Changing Industry Marketing Practices Can Reduce Crime

As former ATF Crime Gun Analysis Chief Joseph J. Vince, Jr. has said:

In examining enforcement activities and results across the United States, we have found one universal maxim: Decrease the amount and availability of illegally trafficked firearms in a community, and the number of violent crimes will also go down.\textsuperscript{131}

Gun trafficking can be addressed in several ways. One of the most effective methods to reduce the flow of guns into the criminal market is to limit sales of handguns to one per month per buyer. Without multiple sales, the value of straw purchasing as a means to obtain crime guns is dramatically reduced, because if a straw purchaser can only legally obtain one handgun a month, a gun trafficker would need to recruit hundreds of straw purchasers to acquire the number of guns a single straw buyer could buy today. The effectiveness of this limit has been proven in Virginia, which passed its one-gun-a-month law in July 1993.\textsuperscript{132} Prior to that time, Virginia was the leading source state for crime guns traced by law enforcement in the northeast.\textsuperscript{133} After the

\textsuperscript{128} 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).

\textsuperscript{129} See Allen & Portes, supra note 99, at 12-15.

\textsuperscript{130} See Kairys, supra note 11, at 7 (quoting affidavit of David. W. Stewart in First Commercial Trust Co. v. Lorcin Eng’g, Inc., No. 94-3006 (Ark. Cir. Ct. 1994), aff’d, 900 S.W.2d 202 (Ark. 1995)). Lorcin has recently filed for Chapter 7 dissolution under the Bankruptcy Code.

\textsuperscript{131} Memo from the Chief, CGAB Shots 2 (Jan. 1998) (emphasis in original).

\textsuperscript{132} See supra note 107, and accompanying text (citing Virginia law).

law took effect, however, Virginia’s position as a source of crime guns trafficked into other states dropped dramatically. Background checks have also proven effective in reducing gun trafficking.

The gun industry could itself institute controls to reduce firearms trafficking. A system of training, monitoring, and disciplining dealers could be instituted through contracts between gun manufacturers and their downstream distributors, much in the way that certain businesses require dealers to be “authorized” before being able to sell the manufacturer’s product line. Other industries selling products where the danger of misuse is high, such as chemical products and SCUBA diving equipment, have instituted marketing controls, including franchising retail sales outlets, restricting retail sales through distribution contracts, and requiring safe sales practices at the retail level. Specific controls gun manufacturers could implement include: requiring dealers to maintain a retail place of business and carry full liability insurance coverage, training dealers on how to minimize the risk of transfers to illegitimate purchasers, tracking ATF trace requests through distribution channels to identify, retrain, sanction and/or terminate distributors and dealers that are repeatedly the subject of crime gun traces, requiring dealers to limit sales to individuals to one handgun per month, prohibiting dealers from selling at gun shows, and requiring dealers to secure their firearms from theft.

This point was recently underscored by leading gun maker Smith & Wesson, which this year started requiring its “stocking” gun dealers to sign a new “Code of Responsible Business

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134 Id. For example, Virginia’s share of crime guns ending up in New York dropped 66% after the law took effect. With other northeast states, the effect was similar. Id. at 1760. See also Polston, supra note 93, at 830-33 (discussing data). Maryland’s one-gun-a-month has also been effective. See Testimony of Sarah Brady, supra note 113, (Baltimore police recovered one-third fewer handguns the year after Maryland’s one-gun-a-month law took effect).

135 See Douglas S. Weil, Traffic Stop: How the Brady Act Disrupts Interstate Gun Trafficking (Center to Prevent Handgun Violence 1997). The study compared the percentage of guns traced to crime recovered in seven recipient states that had originated in four source states for the periods before, and after, the Brady Law took effect. The impact was dramatic. After passage of Brady, the four source states provided a lower percentage of crime weapons to every one of the seven recipient states, with most showing declines well above 50%. Id. at 4-10.


Practices” or be cut off. Unfortunately, the Code is very weak, merely requiring dealers to maintain a store premise, to not “knowingly” sell firearms to straw purchasers or otherwise violate the law, and to comply with other minimal provisions. Smith & Wesson has the right under the Code to terminate dealers who have been sued by municipalities for negligent distribution practices.


140 Id. Smith & Wesson has already terminated two of the Chicago-area storefront dealers implicated in the Chicago lawsuit.
C. The Gun Industry Is Aware Of The Problem, But Does Nothing

The gun industry is well aware of its lax distribution practices, but continues to ignore the crime problem it creates because of the profits at stake. Robert Hass, a former Senior Vice-President of Marketing and Sales at Smith & Wesson, the nation’s largest gun manufacturer, admitted the industry’s knowledge in a sworn affidavit.

The company and the industry as a whole are fully aware of the extent of the criminal misuse of firearms. The company and the industry are also aware that the black market in firearms is not simply the result of stolen guns but is due to the seepage of guns into the illicit market from multiple thousands of unsupervised federal firearms licensees. In spite of their knowledge, however, the industry’s position has consistently been to take no independent action to insure responsible distribution practices . . . . I am familiar with the distribution and marketing practices of all the principle U.S. firearms manufacturers and wholesale distributors and none of them, to my knowledge, take additional steps, beyond determining the possession of a federal firearms license, to investigate, screen or supervise the wholesale distributors and retail outlets that sell their products to insure that their products are distributed responsibly.\(^{141}\)

Other industry executives have also admitted that gun manufacturers deliberately choose not to oversee dealers, or impose controls that would help inhibit trafficking.\(^{142}\)

Industry stonewalling recently led Robert Lockett, a storefront gun dealer in suburban Kansas City, to publish an article in *Shooting Sports Retailer* blasting gun manufacturers for claiming that nothing could be done to control distribution.\(^{143}\)

I’ve been told INNUMERABLE times by various manufacturers that they ‘have no control’ over their channel of distribution. I’ve been told INNUMERABLE times that once a firearm is sold to a distributor, there is no way a manufacturer can be held responsible for the legal transfer and possession


of a firearm. Well, good people, a jury in New York [in the *Hamilton v. Accu-Tek* case] has now told you otherwise.

**IF YOU DO NOT KNOW WHERE AND HOW YOUR PRODUCTS ARE ULTIMATELY BEING SOLD – YOU SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OR ANTICIPATED THAT THEY WOULD BE ILLEGALLY SOLD AND SUBSEQUENTLY MISUSED.**

Let’s just get down and dirty. We manufacture, distribute, and retail items of deadly force. . . . Your arguments of yesterday regarding lack of accountability were pretty flimsy. Today, they are tenuous at best. Tomorrow, they are not going to indemnify you. We are going to have to get a whole lot better – and fast – of being in control of our distribution channel.  

The gun industry apparently takes this “see no evil” approach regarding the funneling of guns to crime for at least two reasons. First, the industry reaps huge profits on all the guns channeled through its legal but lax distribution system that quickly and easily end up in the hands of criminals, juveniles, and other prohibited purchasers. Second, by selling guns through middlemen distributors and dealers over whom manufacturers scrupulously avoid control, manufacturers seek to insulate themselves from liability. Litigation like the *Hamilton* case and the city lawsuits is beginning to break down this barrier.

**D. The Chicago Lawsuit -- *Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., et al.***

In 1998, Chicago aggressively attacked the trafficking problem with an extensive undercover investigation, called Operation Gunsmoke, that brought all of these issues into sharp focus.

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145 *See supra* notes 100-02 and accompanying text (discussing magnitude of diversion of guns to crime). Of particular note is the fact that approximately 15% of the guns traced to crime in the United States are seized from 18-20 year old youths, who cannot legally purchase handguns. *See Gun Crimes in the Age Group 18-10, supra* note 101, at 3, 10, Fig. 3 (noting also that 85% of the guns seized from these youths are handguns); *27 Cities Report, supra* note 11, at 10, Fig. 1.

146 No other conclusion can be drawn from gun manufacturer’s irrational decision to avoid contractual and information-sharing relationships with downstream sellers. Other manufacturers routinely seek as much information as possible about who is buying their products so they can improve production and marketing efficiency. Gun makers, by contrast, have gone out of their way to avoid obtaining this information from sellers.
Over a three-month period, the Chicago Police Department sent two-person teams into the twelve gun stores ringing Chicago that had sold the highest numbers of guns traced to crime within the city, and purchased 171 firearms. Both agents carried identification indicating they lived in Chicago, where it has been illegal to own handguns since 1982. Only one of the agents carried a firearm owner identification (“FOID”) card, which is required under Illinois law to purchase a firearm in the state. The agent who did not have an FOID card, and therefore whom the dealer knew was a disqualified buyer, nevertheless did the talking, placed the cash on the counter, and walked out with the gun. The agents openly bragged about needing the guns to “settle a score,” to resell the firearms to drug gangs, and to use in other criminal enterprises. Despite these brazen indications of criminal intent, in each case the suburban dealers sold the firearms. In many cases, the dealers even counseled the agents in how best to arrange a purchase to avoid federal paperwork which might trigger an investigation. Chicago’s investigation also identified numerous cases where Chicagoans, including a police officer, had been killed by firearms trafficked from these same gun dealerships.

Based on this investigation, on November 12, 1998, Chicago filed its lawsuit against the twelve dealers, and the distributors and manufacturers who supplied them with guns. The suit seeks several hundred million dollars in damages to the city caused by crime guns in Chicago. Damages are based on the city’s calculation of the direct costs the city incurred -- for medical, police, fire, and court services -- because of this crisis. The suit alleges that the gun industry

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147 Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., supra note 2, amended complaint at 22-54.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 13.
150 Id. at 13-14 (listing municipal gun laws violated by dealers).
151 Id. at 25-27, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 45, 46-48, 49.
152 Id. at 28-29.
153 Id. at 23-24, 25, 30, 34, 38, 41, 43, 45.
154 Id. at 22-54 (detailing negligent conduct of dealers in making sales).
155 Id. at 16-20. Many of the firearms traced to crime were originally purchased as part of multiple sales.
156 Id. at 7-9.
157 Id. at 76-77.
158 Id.
created a public nuisance by facilitating trafficking of large numbers of firearms into Chicago that would foreseeably lead to crime.\textsuperscript{159} In his remarks announcing the suit, Mayor Daley analogized the gun industry to polluters, who have long been held liable for dumping waste into rivers and injuring people downstream.\textsuperscript{160}

Chicago’s lawsuit builds on the pathbreaking victory secured earlier this year in \textit{Hamilton v. Accu-tek}, in which a Brooklyn jury concluded that fifteen major gun manufacturers negligently distributed their firearms and were thus responsible for the foreseeable crime that resulted.\textsuperscript{161} The \textit{Hamilton} case was tried on behalf of the families of seven New York victims of handgun violence, all but one of whom was killed, and for none of whom was the gun recovered.\textsuperscript{162} Plaintiffs persuaded the jury with evidence showing that gun manufacturers oversupplied the market and failed to implement any controls over downstream distributors, knowing that a large percentage of guns it sold through legal channels would end up being diverted to the criminal market and being criminally misused.\textsuperscript{163} On post-trial motions, the court upheld the verdict, finding that gun manufacturers had a duty to distribute firearms responsibly,\textsuperscript{164} and could control

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\textsuperscript{159} \textit{Id.} at 70-76.

\textsuperscript{160} \textit{See Remarks of Mayor Rickard M. Daley – Gun Lawsuit Press Conference (Nov. 12, 1998) (available at www.ci.chi.il.us/Mayor/Speeches/GunLawSuit).}


\textsuperscript{162} \textit{See id.} at 808-10 (identifying plaintiffs).

\textsuperscript{163} \textit{Id.} at 829-33 (recounting evidence of negligent distribution sufficient to support jury findings).

\textsuperscript{164} \textit{Id.} at 818-27. In framing the duty, the court held:

The duty sought to be imposed by the plaintiffs here is circumscribed. It is the duty of manufacturers of a uniquely hazardous product, designed to kill and wound human beings, to take reasonable steps available at the point of their sale to primary distributors to reduce the possibility that these instruments will fall into the hands of those likely to misuse them. Such a limited duty is consistent with manufacturers’ traditional broad duties . . . .

\textit{Id.} at 825.

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their distribution network.\textsuperscript{165} Their failure to do so caused firearms to fall into the wrong hands where they would foreseeably be used in crime, the court held.\textsuperscript{166}

Although Illinois’ gun-control statutes give Chicago certain advantages to identify scofflaw dealers,\textsuperscript{167} the trafficking problems identified in the Chicago complaint and the Hamilton case certainly occur in other jurisdictions. Indeed, undercover stings conducted in Wayne County, Michigan and Gary, Indiana after the Chicago lawsuit was filed indicate the industry’s negligent distribution practices are deep-seated and pervasive. In both cases, buyers posing as convicted felons or juveniles were able to buy as many guns as they wanted as long as they had a person with a clean record accompanying them.\textsuperscript{168} One Wayne County dealer went so far as to

\begin{quote}
Defendants’ ongoing close relationship with downstream distributors and retailers putting new guns into consumers’ hands provided them with appreciable control over the ultimate use of their products. Even if they could not control what the first ‘customer’ would do with the gun or whether it would fall into the hands of a person other than the new gun owner, they could reduce the risk of criminal misuse by ensuring that the first sale was by a responsible merchant to a responsible buyer.

\textit{Id.} at 820.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Adams’ ongoing close relationship with downstream distributors and retailers putting new guns into consumers’ hands provided them with appreciable control over the ultimate use of their products. Even if they could not control what the first ‘customer’ would do with the gun or whether it would fall into the hands of a person other than the new gun owner, they could reduce the risk of criminal misuse by ensuring that the first sale was by a responsible merchant to a responsible buyer.

\textit{Id.} at 820.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{165} \textit{Id.} at 820-22. The court held that:

Defendants’ ongoing close relationship with downstream distributors and retailers putting new guns into consumers’ hands provided them with appreciable control over the ultimate use of their products. Even if they could not control what the first ‘customer’ would do with the gun or whether it would fall into the hands of a person other than the new gun owner, they could reduce the risk of criminal misuse by ensuring that the first sale was by a responsible merchant to a responsible buyer.

\textit{Id.} at 820.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Id.} at 838 (holding “there was sufficient evidence to persuade a rational jury that criminal misuse of handguns was a reasonably foreseeable result of defendants’ negligent distribution and marketing practices”).
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{167} Aside from the open expressions of criminal intent, the fact that Chicago’s undercover agents carried identification with Chicago addresses should have put dealers on notice of the buyer’s illicit purpose, since the firearms being bought could not legally be possessed in Chicago. The fact that one buyer lacked an FOID card should also have alerted dealers that a straw purchase for illicit purposes was being made. These restrictions do not apply in most jurisdictions.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{168} In Wayne County, Michigan, during a sting conducted in March and April 1999, undercover officers posing as felons and juveniles were able to purchase more than two dozen firearms, including assault weapons, from local gun dealers. \textit{See} McNamara v. Arms Technology, Inc., \textit{supra} note 12, amended complaint at 25-30. In fifteen buying trips, officers were turned down only four times, and later trips to two of those stores were successful in securing firearms. \textit{Id.} at 30.

In Gary, Indiana, a sting was conducted during June and July 1999. Undercover officers posing as felons or juveniles, or as straw buyers whose background was unknown to the dealer,
state on videotape – “This is a straw purchase. . . . This is highly illegal. . . . This is highly illegal” – yet went ahead and made the sale.\textsuperscript{169} Another dealer fretted about how he could go to jail for completing the transaction, since he knew it was a straw purchase, yet could not resist the more than $500 in cash being offered for the gun and ammunition.\textsuperscript{170} Given this kind of evidence, the two dozen or so cities and counties that have sued the industry for negligent distribution practices should have no difficulty proving their case.\textsuperscript{171}

E. Legal Issues

Chicago’s claims against the gun industry are based on public nuisance law, which protects the right of citizens “to be free from disturbance and reasonable apprehension of danger to person and property.”\textsuperscript{172} A public nuisance claim can be based either on a violation of an

were sold guns and ammunition in nine transactions, while being turned away only four times. Of the four dealers who declined a sale, one made two other straw sales to undercover officers and another made a straw sale at a different store location. \textit{See} King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., \textsuperscript{supra} note 121, complaint at 15-20.

\textsuperscript{169} \textit{See} McNamara v. Arms Technology, Inc., \textsuperscript{supra} note 12, amended complaint at 27 (quoting dealer). The undercover sting was captured on videotape, segments of which have aired on Dateline NBC and other news programs.

\textsuperscript{170} \textit{Id.} at 29.

\textsuperscript{171} Evidence of multiple sales, where it is clear that some or all of the guns are not for personal use, but are instead likely to be resold and used to commit crime, can also be used against the industry. The cities will likely be able to show that a significant percentage of guns sold in this way end up being used in crime, thus making the irresponsibility of these sales foreseeable to gun dealers, distributors, and manufacturers. This link can be bolstered by several factors which heighten the likelihood that a purchase is intended for illicit purposes, including: the number of guns bought at one time or over time, whether the guns are of a type that often turn up in crime, and whether multiple guns of the same make and model are bought. \textit{See} Polston, \textsuperscript{supra} note 93, at 833-35 (explaining legal and factual underpinnings for liability); Kairys, \textsuperscript{supra} note 11, at n.37 (arguing that there should be little difficulty proving after discovery that manufacturers are aware about the details of their market and the risks associated with their products). The fact that such sales are legal in all but four states does not exonerate the industry, as gun sales do not have to be illegal to be negligent. \textit{See, e.g.}, Kitchen v. K-Mart, 697 So.2d 1200 (Fla. 1997) (holding K-Mart liable for lawfully selling a rifle to an intoxicated buyer).

\textsuperscript{172} Village of Des Plaines v. Poyer, 14 N.E. 677 (Ill. 1888). More recently, the Illinois Supreme Court has defined a public nuisance as “an act or omission which obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage to the public in the exercise of rights common to all.” Village of
ordinance designed to protect the public from a threat to its safety or health, or other unreasonable conduct, including negligence. 173 If a public nuisance is found, the court may enjoin industry conduct contributing to the nuisance, and award damages to the city. 174

Chicago has a very strong public nuisance case against the suburban gun dealers who sold guns to Chicago residents and persons without FOID cards in blatant disregard of Illinois law and Chicago’s handgun ban. Operation Gunsmoke also established that dealers are more than willing to sell firearms to persons who are brazen about their criminal intentions. Numerous courts have held that it is negligence to entrust a firearm to a person whom the seller knows or should know is likely to pose a danger to himself or others. 175 Courts have specifically found negligence for
dealer sales to straw purchasers. Chicago’s case against the gun manufacturers is also strong, given their role in creating a marketing system without controls, where straw purchasing and multiple sales are common.

The gun manufacturers deny that nuisance law is applicable, because the focus of the cities’ claims is not on an unreasonable use of or interference with real property. However, that they have reason to know that the purchaser of a firearm is likely to be a danger to herself or others; Bryant v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. App. 1990) (ammunition sellers have duty to scrutinize buyers); Howard Bros. of Phoenix City, Inc. v. Penley, 492 So.2d 965 (Miss. 1986) (finding that dealers “should have in his business some safeguard to see that loaded handgun is not placed in the hands of an unknown person, who may very well be a mental case, unless or until his background can be thoroughly investigated”). This standard has been applied where a purchaser’s comments suggested criminal intent, e.g., Salvi v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 489 N.E.2d 394, 403 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986), or other impairment. E.g., Rubin v. Johnson, 550 N.E.2d 324 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (mentally ill buyer); Phillips v. Roy, 431 So.2d 849 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (mentally ill buyer). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965) (“One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm resulting to them”); Polston, supra note 93, at 840-50 (analyzing application of doctrine of negligent entrustment to firearms dealers).

See West v. Mache of Cochran, Inc., 370 S.E.2d 169 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (holding dealer liable for fatal shooting where gun was sold to shooter’s wife after shooter could not produce identification and had been committed to mental institution); Semenuik v. Chentis, 117 N.E.2d 883 (Ill. Ct. App. 1954) (dealer liable for selling rifle to parents for use by minor son, where minor shot another child).

See supra note 161-66 (discussing jury’s conclusion in Hamilton v. Accu-Tek that 15 major gun manufacturers were negligent in their distribution of handguns). One federal court applying Illinois law indicated that in its view a gun manufacturer could be held liable on a public nuisance claim brought against a gun manufacturer by a shooting victim, but declined to make that ruling because it believed Illinois state courts should speak first on issues of first impression under Illinois law. See Bubalo v. Navegar, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3598 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (dismissing public nuisance claim against assault pistol manufacturer). A state court in Illinois has now made that ruling, finding that gun manufacturers’ negligent marketing and distribution of guns exposes them to liability for creating a public nuisance in Chicago. Ceriale v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99L5628, Order Denying Motion to Dismiss (Cook Cty. Circuit Ct., Nov. 30, 1999). The Ceriale case has been brought by the families of three victims of gun violence who were shot in Chicago with handguns fired by juveniles.
argument confuses the law of private nuisance with that of public nuisance. The manufacturers also insist that they have no control over the alleged nuisance and therefore cannot be held liable for it, but courts have recognized that gun makers can exercise significant control over the use of their products through the manner in which they distribute them.

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178 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B comment h (1965) (“Unlike a private nuisance, a public nuisance does not necessarily involve interference with use and enjoyment of land.”); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 86, at 618 (5th ed. 1984) (private nuisance originated as remedy “narrowly restricted to the invasion of interests in the use or enjoyment of land,” while public nuisance has always been cause of action “extending to virtually any form of annoyance or inconvenience interfering with common public rights”).

179 The manufacturers rely on a number of cases where courts dismissed nuisance claims against manufacturers of products. Each of these cases is distinguishable. See, e.g., City of Bloomington v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 891 F.2d 611, 614 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding defendant not liable for selling hazardous chemical, because it “made every effort” to assure that its distribution of product did not cause harm); City of Manchester v. National Gypsum Co., 637 F. Supp. 646, 656 (D.R.I. 1986) (finding company not liable for installing asbestos in schools because it already stopped manufacturing and selling the product and therefore “no longer had the power to abate the nuisance”). At least one court has expressly recognized that such cases do not “categorically reliefe manufacturers or suppliers of goods from liability for nuisance.” Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving Co. of America, Inc., 221 Cal. App. 3d 1601, 1619 n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).

180 See supra note 165, at *43 (quoting Hamilton v. Accu-Tek court’s conclusion that tight link between manufacturer and downstream distributors gives manufacturers sufficient control); Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 75 Cal. App. 4th 500, 562 (1999) (gun manufacturer never lost complete control over consequences of its sales because “[t]hough it did not retain such total control over the persons to whom the weapon would be resold, it nonetheless had the ability to restrict distribution of its weapons” and it “possessed complete control of the manner in which its products were marketed”). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 834 (1965) (imposing nuisance liability on those parties who participate to substantial extent in creating or carrying on the nuisance); Kairys, supra note 10, at 14 (arguing for manufacturer liability under nuisance law); supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing controls available to manufacturers).

Outside the nuisance context, several courts have rejected claims that handgun manufacturers should be liable for failing to control the distribution of their products, but none of those cases involved strong allegations or evidence of negligent actions by the manufacturer beyond the mere act of selling a product capable of inflicting injury. See supra note 86 (listing cases).
IV. ADDITIONAL APPROACHES

A. Challenging Deceptive Advertising

Another area where the gun industry has acted irresponsibly is in marketing guns as increasing the safety of gun owners and their families, when empirical research has demonstrated just the opposite is the case. Indeed, the latest case study shows that a gun in the home is twenty-two times more likely to be involved in a fatal or nonfatal unintentional shooting (four-to-one), criminal assault or homicide (seven-to-one), or suicide attempt (eleven-to-one), than to

Recent studies have been completed in this area, and all conclude that the risk of guns in the home is far greater to occupants than to potential intruders. See Arthur L. Kellermann, et al., Injuries and Deaths Due to Firearms in the Home, 45 J. TRAUMA: INJURY, INFECTION, AND CRITICAL CARE 263 (1998); James E. Bailey, et al., Risk Factors for Violent Death of Women in the Home, 157 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 777 (1997); Peter Cummings, et al., The Association Between the Purchase of a Handgun and Homicide or Suicide, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 974 (1997); Arthur L. Kellermann, et al., Weapon Involvement in Home Invasion Crimes, 273 JAMA 1759 (1995); Arthur L. Kellermann, et al., Gun Ownership as a Risk Factor for Homicide in the Home, 329 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1084 (1993); Arthur L. Kellermann, et al., Suicide in the Home in Relation to Gun Ownership, 327 N. ENGL. J. MED. 467 (1993); David A. Brent, et al., Firearms and Adolescent Suicide: A Community-Based Case-Control Study, 147 AM. J. DIS. CHILD 1066 (1993); Douglas S. Weil & David Hemenway, Loaded Guns in the Home, 267 JAMA 3033 (1992); Arthur L. Kellermann, Protection or Peril? An Analysis of Firearm-Related Deaths in the Home, 314 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1557 (1986).


Gun ownership provides additional risks to children living in those homes, increasing the risks of suicide and unintentional shootings. See David C. Grossman, Self-Inflicted and Unintentional Firearm Injuries Among Children and Adolescents, 153 ARCH. PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 875 (Aug. 1999) (more than 75% of guns used in suicide attempts and unintentional injuries were stored in the residences of the victim, a relative, or a friend). See also David A. Brent et al., The Presence and Accessibility of Firearms in the Homes of Adolescent Suicides: A Case-Control Study, 266 JAMA 2989 (1991); David Lester & Ronald Clarke, Note on ‘Suicide and Increased Availability of Handguns in the United States: The Influence of Firearm Ownership on Accidental Deaths, 32 SOC. SCI. MED 1311 (1991).
be used to injure or kill in self-defense.\textsuperscript{182} Despite this data, the gun industry has circulated numerous advertisements, often depicting mothers and young children, urging homeowners to purchase handguns for home protection.\textsuperscript{183} Numerous cities and counties have attacked this problem in their complaints, alleging that the industry’s misconduct has caused preventable local shootings to which the city or county must respond.\textsuperscript{184}

In 1996, the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence, joined by numerous public health organizations and 75 noted public health researchers, filed a petition with the Federal Trade Commission challenging the industry’s advertising as unfair and deceptive.\textsuperscript{185} These practices

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{182} See Kellermann, \textit{Injuries and Deaths}, supra note 181, at 263.
\item \textsuperscript{183} See \textit{FTC Petition, infra} note 185 (attaching advertisements). See also Kairys, \textit{supra} note 10, at 17-18 (reprinting ads); Jon D. Handon & Douglas A. Kysar, \textit{Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation}, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1420, 1463 (1999) (describing how gun manufacturers capitalize on women’s fears regarding personal protection and home defense in advertising their products).
\item \textsuperscript{184} See, e.g., Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., \textit{supra} note 75, amended complaint at 23-25, 30-32 (alleging causes of action under Connecticut’s consumer protection statute and common law negligence); People of the State of California v. Arcadia Machine & Tool, Inc., No. 303753, amended complaint at 26-28, 31-35 (S.F. Superior Ct.) (pleading causes of action under California consumer protection laws).
\end{itemize}

The FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 42 et seq., empowers the FTC “to prevent persons, partnerships, [and] corporations . . . from using . . . unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” FTC Act § 45(a)(2). Under FTC standards, a practice is “unfair” if it may cause unjustified consumer injury. A consumer injury is unjustified if it (1) is substantial; (2) is not outweighed by any benefits it bestows upon consumers or competitors; and (3) could not reasonably have been avoided by the consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 45(3)(n); Commission Statement of Policy on the Scope of the Consumer Unfairness Jurisdiction, 104 F.T.C. 1072 (1984) [hereinafter Unfairness Statement]. An advertising practice that results in severe injury to even a small number of people may be deemed unfair. International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1064 (1984). If the practice is likely to result in serious bodily injury, it is “especially likely” that a cost-benefit analysis will support a finding of unfairness. \textit{Id.} at 1065 n.57. Finally, even if a consumer could avoid injury by choosing other products, a practice will be deemed unfair if it “unreasonably creates or takes advantage of an obstacle to the free exercise of consumer
also likely violate state consumer protection statutes, as several cities have alleged. In California, the penalties against company wrongdoing can be quite severe, including fines for each violation.

**B. Assault Weapons And Gun Kits.**

Lawsuits can also be brought against gun manufacturers for negligent marketing of weapons of mass destruction. The Center’s Legal Action Project has brought two such suits: *Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.*, and *Halberstam v. S.W. Daniel*. Of these, the *Merrill* case is by far the most significant, since it is the first appellate decision in the United States holding that a gun manufacturer can be liable for negligence leading to violence.

decisionmaking,” which can include withholding or failing to include information that may be critical to informed comparison and consumer choice. Unfairness Statement, 104 F.T.C. at 1074.

Clearly, the industry’s ads satisfy these criteria. First, based on the studies cited above, they are likely to cause substantial injury by encouraging home gun ownership. Second, given the magnitude of the harm to consumers, the benefit of eliminating them outweighs the costs of stopping them. Third, because the manufacturers’ failure to include anything about the risks posed by guns in the home interferes with informed consumer choice, the reasonable consumer cannot avoid the injury imposed by the ads. Fourth, this problem is compounded by the improper storage of guns depicted in many ads, where guns are left loaded on nightstands. Public policy also supports liability in states with child access prevention laws.

A practice can be deemed deceptive if representations are “material” to the consumer’s decision to purchase the product and are likely to mislead the reasonable consumer. FTC Statement on Deception, 103 F.T.C. 174, 183 (1984). The ad need not mislead all or even most consumers to be found deceptive. *Id.* at 177. For the reasons cited under unfairness, these ads are also deceptive.


*See* Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17206 (allowing assessment of penalties of up to $2,500 for each violation).


No. 95-3325 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).

The Merrill lawsuit stemmed from a July 1993 rampage by a mentally deranged man armed with two TEC-9 assault pistols and hundreds of rounds of ammunition which enabled him to kill eight people and injure six others in a San Francisco office building in a matter of minutes.\(^{191}\) The Center’s lawsuit alleged that because Navegar designed the TEC-9 for mass destruction and without legitimate self defense or sporting purpose, it was negligent to sell this assault pistol to the general public, as it was foreseeable the guns would enable a criminal to carry out such a mass assault.\(^{192}\) Considerable evidence obtained through discovery helped prove this allegation, and showed how consciously the company had targeted the criminal market.\(^{193}\) The case was also bolstered by California’s assault weapons statute, which banned, among other guns, the TEC-9s used in the shooting.\(^{194}\) Nevertheless, after ruling at the demurrer stage that plaintiffs were not presenting “just another gun case,” the district court judge reversed his position after discovery was complete and dismissed the case on summary judgment.\(^{195}\)

On appeal, the First Appellate District of California reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that Navegar owed a duty to defendants.\(^{196}\)


\(^{192}\) Id. at 523.

\(^{193}\) For example, Navegar, the Florida company that made TEC-9s, advertised them as “tough as your toughest customer,” and having “an excellent resistance to fingerprints,” in addition to being “paramilitary” in appearance. Id. at 515. The guns were adapted from submachine guns, and two company executives were convicted of selling conversion kits to make TEC-9s fully automatic. Id. at 516. After a newspaper study showed that assault weapons were disproportionately associated with crime, and the TEC-9 was the assault weapon most preferred by criminals, Navegar’s marketing executives raved: “I’m kind of flattered. It just has that advertising tingle to it. Hey, it’s talked about, its read about, the media write about it. That generates more sales for me. It might sound cold and cruel, but I’m sales oriented.” Id. at 516. The company president also admitted: “I know some of the guns going out of here end up killing people, but I’m not responsible for that.” Id. at 519. These are just a few of the facts recounted in detail in the appellate court’s opinion. See id. at 509-20.

\(^{194}\) See Cal. Penal Code § 12275 et seq. (banning assault weapons after finding that their proliferation and use “poses a threat to the health, safety, and security of all citizens of the state”).

\(^{195}\) See In re 101 California Street, No. 959-316, unpublished Opinion and Order Re Motion for Summary Judgment (Cal. Sup. Ct., May 6, 1997) (finding that Navegar had no duty to the injured plaintiffs).

Fundamental fairness requires that those who create and profit from commerce in a potentially dangerous instrumentality should be liable for conduct that unreasonably increases the risk of injury above and beyond that necessarily presented by their enterprise.\footnote{Id.}

The court rejected Navegar’s argument that it could not be liable because its sale of the TEC-9 was entirely legal. “[W]e are aware of no tort principle that the marketing or distribution to the public of a product cannot as a matter of law constitute negligence because those activities have not been criminalized,” the court held.\footnote{Id. at 544. See also id. at 537-40.} The court also scoffed at the notion that such questions must be left to the legislature,\footnote{Id. at 547.} and found the increased risk created by Navegar’s misconduct sufficiently caused the mass shooting so as to hold it liable.\footnote{Id. at 553-59.}

The *Halberstam* case stemmed from a March 1994 assault on a van load of Hasidic Jews on the Brooklyn Bridge in which a Cobray M-11/9 assault pistol was used.\footnote{See Nichole M. Christian, *Makers of Pistol Sued in Fatal Bridge Shooting*, N.Y. TIMES, March 14, 1998, at A19; Bill Hewitt et al., *Retribution Not Forgiving or Forgetting, a Shooting Victim’s Family Takes a Pair of Gun Makers to Court*, PEOPLE MAG., March 23, 1998, at 81.} The Cobray’s maker designed the gun to evade federal gun laws and appeal to criminals by selling it through the mail as a disassembled “kit,” without a serial number, and with no means of tracing it to a criminal buyer.\footnote{It is illegal to sell a firearm through the mail, except to FFLs. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(b). A “firearm” is defined to include an assembled gun, as well as the frame or receiver of any such weapon. 18 U.S.C. § 921(3). The Cobray’s makers sought to avoid these laws by shipping all of the parts for the fully-automatic Cobray except for the frame, which they would ship as a flat, shaped, piece of metal that could easily be folded into a completed frame. The company then advertised its guns in Shotgun News as “the gun that made the 90’s roar” alongside a picture of a gangster. The company further assured buyers that any information about them would be destroyed after the purchase was completed.}
In February 1998, the Center won a critical ruling when the federal judge held that there was sufficient legal basis for the suit, marking the first time a suit seeking to hold a gun manufacturer liable for the criminal use of its product had ever been permitted to go to trial.203 Following the March 1998 trial, however, the jury ruled for the defendants. Post-trial interviews with the jurors indicated that, although they found the defendants’ conduct reprehensible, they did not view it as a “cause” of the shooting, and therefore found no liability.204

203 See Halberstam v. S.W. Daniel, No. 95-3325 (E.D.N.Y.). Defendants motion was denied from the bench on March 18, 1997, so there is no written opinion.

CONCLUSION

Although not yet as widespread as the tobacco wars, the city and county lawsuits against the $2-billion-a-year gun industry may have even more far-reaching impact than state-sponsored lawsuits have had on the tobacco industry. Whereas the state tobacco suits ended up focusing mostly on money, the city and county lawsuits against the gun industry are primarily focused on reforming the industry’s irresponsible conduct. Forcing the industry to incorporate feasible safety devices in all guns—especially locking technology to prevent unauthorized access and misuse—could prevent thousands of injuries and deaths, especially among children. Similar effects would likely flow once the gun industry stops duping the public into believing that guns increase home security, when empirical data proves the opposite is true. Finally, the greatest benefits may come from forcing the industry to tighten controls over its lax distribution network, thereby choking off the major gun pipeline for criminals, juveniles, and other dangerous gun purchasers. Certainly these are laudable goals, and the cities and counties which have filed suit to bring about these reforms deserve to be commended.